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TATES' and nations' laws collide when foreign factors appear in a
lawsuit. Nonresident litigants, incidents outside the forum, parallel
lawsuits, and judgments from other jurisdictions can create
problems with personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition of
foreign judgments. This article reviews Texas conflicts cases from Texas
state and federal courts during the Survey period from October 1, 2001,
through November 1, 2002. The article excludes cases involving federal-
state conflicts, intrastate issues such as subject matter jurisdiction and
venue, and conflicts in time, such as the applicability of prior or subse-
quent law within a state.
State and federal cases are discussed together because conflict of laws
is mostly a state law topic, except for a few constitutional limits, resulting
in the same rules applying to most issues in state and federal courts.1 The
discussion is organized according to conflict of laws categories. For juris-
diction over nonresidents, the categories are the grounds for amenabil-
ity-consent, forum contacts, and grounds for declining jurisdiction. The
choice of law categories reflect the hierarchy of choice of law rules, first
statutory, then party choice of law, then the Restatement (Second)'s
most-significant-relationship test, followed by miscellaneous issues such
as constitutional limits, proof of foreign law, and limitations. The foreign
judgments categories are enforcement (according to specific uniform
acts) and preclusion (interstate and international).
During the Survey period, forum contests included a variety of jurisdic-
tional assertions over nonresidents in contract, tort and other settings.
Jurisdictional theories included a service-of-suit clause construed as con-
sent to amenability, 2 alter-ego3 and the single-enterprise doctrine, 4 and
cases exploring the boundaries of general jurisdiction (such as jurisdiction
based on unrelated banking activity5). Jurisdiction was lacking over a
Belgian employment law claim,6 and a nationwide federal long-arm failed
because of a predicate venue provision.7 Courts reached opposite results
1. For a thorough discussion of the role of federal law in choice of law questions, see
RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 649-95 (4th ed. 2001)
[hereinafter WEINTRAUB].
2. See infra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 38-58 and accompanying text.
4, See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 99-1.12 and accompanying text.
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in two internet cases, 8 discussed retained jurisdiction under the new child
custody act,9 and issued an unauthorized anti-suit injunction against a
Mississippi lawsuit. 10
Choice of law cases affirmed the parties' right to choose their gov-
erning law," declined to adopt the Restatement's statute of limitations
rule,' 2 upheld arbitration agreements but strictly construed them to ex-
clude children not subject to the contract,' 3 applied Texas insurance
law-the insurable interest doctrine-to several companies' purchase of
life insurance policies on Texas employees (and considered the constitu-
tionality given the case's contacts with eight states),' 4 reiterated the re-
quirements for proof of foreign law,15 and applied Texas's new borrowing
statute to an asbestosis claim arising in Alaska.
16
Foreign judgments cases discussed the difference between jurisdictional
facts and the merits in a jurisdictional challenge to a New Jersey judg-
ment,17 upheld the validity of English due process, 8 and found the Uni-
form Foreign Country Money Judgment Recognition Act persuasive in a
preclusion case rejecting a non-monetary Mexican judgment. 19
I. FORUM CONTESTS
Asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant requires amenabil-
ity to Texas jurisdiction and receipt of proper notice. Amenability may
be established by consent (usually based on contract's forum selection
clause), waiver (failing a timely objection), or extraterritorial service of
process under a Texas long-arm statute. Because most aspects of notice
are purely matters of forum law, this article will focus primarily on the
issues relating to amenability.
A. CONSENT AND WAIVER
Contracting parties may agree to a forum selection clause designating
either an optional or exclusive site for litigation or arbitration. When a
contracting party sues in the designated forum, the clause is said to be a
prorogation clause, that is, one supporting the forum's jurisdiction over
the defendant. When a contracting party sues in a non-selected forum in
violation of the contract, the clause is said to be a derogation clause, that
is, one undermining the forum's jurisdiction. Only valid prorogation
clauses establish personal jurisdiction, and they are discussed in this sec-
8. See infra notes 113-30 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 138-52 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 255-65 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 281-87 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 288-89 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 334-45 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 309-23 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 434-47 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 416-23 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 453-67 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 468-82 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 484-507 and accompanying text.
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tion. Derogation clauses are discussed below as a grounds for the forum
to decline otherwise valid jurisdiction.
20
Not all forum selection clauses look alike, and courts may construe
them in ways not contemplated, at least by defendant, at the contract's
signing. Ace Insurance Co. v. Zurich American Insurance Co.,21 held that
a foreign insurer consented to Texas jurisdiction in the wording of a "ser-
vice of suit" clause. Ace, a Belgian casualty insurer based in London,
reinsured a portion of Zurich American's policy that had been issued to a
Houston-based drilling company, Nabors Industries, Inc., and its affiliate
Nadrico Saudi, Ltd. Zurich's original policy had a clause titled "Service
of Suit Clause (USA)" that read in pertinent part, "[T]he Underwriters
hereon, at the request of the Insured (or Reinsured), will submit to the
jurisdiction of a Court of competent jurisdiction within the United
States. '22 Ace's reinsurance policy incorporated the service-of-suit
clause. 23
Nadrico filed a claim when one of its wells blew out in Saudi Arabia.
Zurich paid the claim, but Ace refused for lack of timely filing. Zurich
sued Ace in a state district court in Houston, which denied Ace's objec-
tion to jurisdiction based on the service of suit clause.24 On appeal, Ace
argued that it had not consented to personal jurisdiction because the
Texas court was not a court of competent jurisdiction as required in the
service-of-suit clause. Ace maintained that judicial competence includes
both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, thus disqualifying a Texas
court that (apart from the service-of-suit clause) lacked personal jurisdic-
tion (according to Ace). Ace relied on an Indiana case which defined
"court of competent jurisdiction" to include personal jurisdiction, citing
the Supreme Court's United States v. Morton as authority.25 Contrary to
Ace's position, however, Morton's discussion of competence was limited
to subject matter jurisdiction and did not discuss personal jurisdiction.26
20. See EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 360-71 (2d ed. 1992)
[hereinafter SCOLES & HAY]; James P. George, Parallel Litigation, 51 BAYLOR L. REV.
769, 912-21 (1999) [hereinafter Parallel Litigation]. For a discussion of forum derogation
clauses, see infra notes 184-94 and accompanying text.
21. Ace Ins. Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 59 S.W.3d 424 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
22. Id. at 426.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 427. Just prior to this, Ace sued Zurich in England seeking a declaration of
nonliability. The English court refused to act on Ace's argument of lack of Texas jurisdic-
tion for lack of evidence that the Texas court lacked competence. Id. at 427 (citing Ace
Ins. SA-NV (Formerly) Cigna Ins. Co. of Europe SA-NV v. Zurich Ins. Co. and Zurich
Am. Ins. Co., [2001] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 618, 630).
25. Id. at 428; George S. May Int'l Co. v. King, 629 N.E.2d 257, 262 (Ind. Ct. App.
1994) (citing United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984)).
26. Examining a federal statute, Morton noted that "competent jurisdiction" had been
used on occasion to refer to a court's jurisdiction over the defendant's person, but then
went on to say that statutory phrases are not construed in isolation and must be read as
part of the statute as a whole. After considering the statute as a whole the court held only




Applying Morton's reasoning to Ace's argument, the Houston Court of
Appeals construed the reinsurance contract. Rules of contract construc-
tion, like those of statutory construction, require that the contract be read
as a whole to give every clause meaning.27 The court held that Ace's
interpretation failed because it would render the service-of-suit clause
meaningless-a party subject to a court's personal jurisdiction would
have no need to agree to submit to that court.28 Although no Texas cases
have construed the effect on personal jurisdiction of service-of-suit
clauses, the court cited a Fifth Circuit case and others reaching that
conclusion.
29
The court's reasoning fails to consider the distinction between amena-
bility and service of process. This service-of-suit clause is conceivably
nothing more than an agreement for uncontested receipt of service, and
only after a suit has been filed in a court that has personal jurisdiction,
subject matter jurisdiction, and venue. The court's construction here ren-
ders Ace amenable (that is, subject to personal jurisdiction) in any court
in the United States having subject matter jurisdiction for this lawsuit.
This necessarily includes all state courts of general subject matter jurisdic-
tion, and all federal courts with diverse parties and claims exceeding
$75,000. That amounts to a lot of courts, and it is unlikely that con-
tracting parties would submit to such broad jurisdictional exposure. In
the decision's favor, it can be argued that a party accepting service of
process has either consented or waived objections to amenability, but that
is not what this clause says. Rather, the clause provides that the under-
writers "will submit to the jurisdiction of a Court of competent jurisdic-
tion within the United States."' 30 While submit can have different
meanings, when read as a whole with the clause's title-"Service of Suit
(USA)"-it is plausible that the clause does nothing more than waive
objection to service after a proper suit has been filed in a proper forum.
At the very least, the clause is ambiguous. On the other hand, Ace was
probably amenable in any event because of Nabors's Houston location
and the contract's implicit contemplation that Ace was amenable some-
where in the United States. But that amenability should be established
either by an explicit forum selection clause, or by a long-arm statute and
due process.
The Survey period had no jurisdictional waiver cases implicating issues
of nonresident amenability.
27. id. at 428 (citing State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Beaston, 907 S.W.2d 430, 433 (Tex.
1995); Westwind Exploration, Inc. v. Homestate Sav. Ass'n, 696 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tex.
1985)).
28. Id. at 428-29.
29. Id. at 429 (citing McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Lloyd's Underwriters of London, 944
F.2d 1199, 1206 (5th Cir. 1991); In re Delta Am. Re Ins. Co., 900 F.2d 890, 893 (6th Cir.
1990); Columbia Cas. Co. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 635 N.Y.S.2d 173, 177 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1995)).
30. Id. at 426.
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B. NONRESIDENT'S FORUM CONTACTS
Three predicates are important in understanding personal jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants who have not consented or waived their ob-
jections. First, the extraterritorial service must be authorized under a
long-arm statute that does not violate due process as defined in the Su-
preme Court's minimum contacts test. 31 Second, Texas long-arm statutes
apply in both state and federal courts in Texas,32 except where Congress
has enacted a federal long-arm statute for a very few federal law claims.
33
In the absence of a federal long-arm statute, parties asserting either fed-
eral question or diversity claims in federal courts must use the local
state's long-arm statute as a starting point for claims against nonresidents.
Third, Texas has a limits-of-due-process long-arm that extends Texas's ex-
traterritorial reach to the limits of the minimum contacts test.34 Accord-
ingly, due process is the only necessary foundation for personal
jurisdiction in Texas courts. This is done in two parts, with a contacts
inquiry (which may be general 35 or specific36), and if a contact exists, a
fairness test to determine whether the forum is too inconvenient for the
defendant, considering the plaintiff's need for a convenient forum, the
forum state's interests, and other factors.37 In spite of due process's dom-
inance, these personal jurisdiction cases are grouped under the long-arm
categories.
31. See U-Anchor Adver., Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977). The primary
Texas long-arm statutes are found at TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-.045
(Vernon 1997), and others are scattered throughout Texas statutes, e.g., TEX. AGRIC. CODE
ANN. § 161.132 (Vernon 1982) (violation of certain agricultural statutes); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 6.305 (Vernon 1998) (nonresident respondents in divorce actions); TEX. INS. CODE
ANN. § 823.457 (Vernon Supp. 2003) (violations of duties imposed on insurance holding
companies).
32. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (k)(1)(A).
33. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(D). Examples of federal long-arm statutes include 28
U.S.C. § 2361 (1994) for statutory interpleader, and 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1997) for claims
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
34. See U-Anchor Adver., Inc., 553 S.W.2d at 762.
35. General jurisdiction is based on the nonresident's forum contacts unrelated to
plaintiff's claim. These contacts must be "continuous and systematic" and form a strong
connection to the forum. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 414-15 (1984). Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C.,
815 S.W.2d 223, 228 (Tex. 1991).
36. Specific jurisdiction is based on the nonresident's forum contacts related to the
plaintiff's claim, through which defendant purposefully availed itself of the benefits and
protections of forum law, or could foresee or reasonably anticipate being subjected to per-
sonal jurisdiction. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-76 (1985). A
narrower category of specific jurisdiction exists where a nonresident having no forum con-
tacts has placed its product in the stream of commerce knowing that it could find its way to
the forum state. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102
(1987).
37. The fair play and substantial justice test is a five-factor balancing test examining
(1) "the burden on the defendant," (2) "the forum state's interests in adjudicating the
dispute," (3) "the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief," (4) "the
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controver-
sies," and (5) "the shared interests of the several states in furthering fundamental substan-
tive social policies." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
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1. The Texas Long-Arm in Commercial Cases
Two Survey period cases considered alter-ego jurisdiction, based on a
related party's Texas contacts. In BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Mar-
chand,38 Belgian-citizen Marchand was terminated after a year's work for
BMC-Software Belgium, N.V. ("BMC-Belgium"), a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of BMC Software, Inc. ("BMCS"), a Delaware corporation based
in Houston. His employment agreement included a promise of stock op-
tions, without specifying when they would be offered, and they never
were. 39 Marchand sued both BMC-Belgium and BMCS in state district
court in Houston for breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepre-
sentation and declaratory relief. BMC-Belgium contested personal juris-
diction but was denied by the trial court and the court of appeals, which
found a basis for both general and specific jurisdiction.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed. Marchand's argument for specific
jurisdiction was based on conversations about the stock option, allegedly
occurring in Texas between Gerd Ordelheide, a BMC-Belgium director
and Max Watson, BMCS's chief executive officer, regarding Marchand's
stock options. Marchand argued that this activity met the Texas long-arm
requirement as a tort committed in whole or in part in Texas.40 The su-
preme court rejected this, characterizing the Watson-Ordelheide talks as
isolated, and holding that Marchand's claim did not arise from anything
that was alleged to have happened in Texas. Instead, his claim arose from
actions occurring in Europe, or in any event, outside Texas. 41 The court
rejected specific jurisdiction without having to address the minimum con-
tacts aspect.
Marchand also alleged general jurisdiction arising from, once again, the
Watson-Ordelheide conversations in Texas, and from BMC-Belgium's
purchase of products from BMCS. General jurisdiction-the assertion of
jurisdiction based on defendants contacts unrelated to plaintiff's claim-
requires that the defendant have continuous and systematic contacts with
the forum.42 The supreme court found these contacts less than the sub-
stantial ones required "to meet the more onerous burden of proving gen-
38. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2002).
39. Marchand's employment agreement was complicated. On March 29, 1996, Mar-
chand and BMC-Belgium signed a letter agreement stating the terms of Marchand's em-
ployment and referencing a "management agreement" that Marchand had presented to
BMC-Belgium, which included options on 20,000 shares of BMCS stock, although the
agreement did not specify when the options would be granted or when Marchand could
exercise them. The management agreement called for BMC-Belgium to hire Procurement,
N.V. (of which Marchand was the sole office and director), meaning that Marchand would
work for Procurement as an independent contractor rather than directly for BMC-
Belgium. Marchand apparently obtained tax advantages under Belgium law under this
arrangement. It isn't clear when Marchand (through Procurement) began working for
BMC-Belgium, but in July 1997, BMC-Belgium ended the arrangement and discharged
Procurement and Marchand. Id. at 793.
40. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042(2) (Vernon 1997).
41. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d at 797-98.




Finally, Marchand alleged general jurisdiction over the Belgian subsidi-
ary as alter ego of its Houston-based parent. The standard for alter ego
jurisdiction is that "the parent corporation exerts such domination and
control over its subsidiary 'that they do not in reality constitute separate
and distinct corporate entities but are one and the same corporation for
purposes of jurisdiction'."' 44 Because Marchand had not overcome Texas's
presumption of separate entities, this theory failed as well.45 The su-
preme court's reversal of jurisdiction over this Belgian employment dis-
pute may be a close call, but the case is important for its clarification of a
courts of appeals split on the standard for reviewing a trial court's denial
of a special appearance. Because that issue is not one of conflicts of law,
it is not discussed at length here.
46
El Puerto De Liverpool v. Servi Mundo Llantero47 is the second alter
ego case, exploring what level of banking activity will result in general
jurisdiction. El Puerto is a Mexican holding company that, among other
things, owns and operates KMart stores in Mexico. Servi Mundo
Llantero, S.A. de C.V. had the exclusive right to construct, operate, and
manage the retail automotive centers in those KMart stores. After four
stores were opened, El Puerto terminated its agreement with Servi
Mundo, which then sued El Puerto in Texas. The trial court found El
Puerto subject to general jurisdiction in Texas.
48
On appeal, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's conclusion with three bases of Texas jurisdiction for this dispute in
Mexico. First, El Puerto was subject to general jurisdiction because of its
significant banking activity through NationsBank in Dallas. In particular,
El Puerto opened a money market investment account as early as 1992
and used it to deposit and withdraw anywhere from ten to several hun-
dreds of millions of U.S. dollars each month. These were sufficiently
large transactions to justify converting the account in 1995 in order to
lower the transaction fees.49 The court was careful to distinguish between
mere banking activity and that sufficient to create general jurisdiction.
Infrequent use is not enough, nor are mere pass-through accounts, where
43. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d at 797 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A., 466
U.S. at 414-15; Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance Ltd., 815 S.W.2d at 228; Schlobohm v.
Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. 1990); CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Tex.
1996)).
44. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d at 798 (quoting Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154,
1159 (5th Cir. 1983), and citing Conner v. ContiCarriers & Terminals, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 405,
418 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ)).
45. Id. at 798-99.
46. The San Antonio Court of Appeals deemed abuse of discretion appropriate be-
cause the issue involves both questions of law and fact. Id. at 793-94 (citations omitted).
Seven other appellate districts have used de novo review, as the First District did in this
case. Id. at 794. The supreme court held that de novo is the proper standard. Id.
47. El Puerto De Liverpool v. Servi Mundo Llantero, 82 S.W.3d 622 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 2002, pet. dismissed w.o.j.).
48. Id. at 637.
49. Id. at 632.
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the account merely serves as a conduit for the funds in transit, to subject
the account holder to general jurisdiction.50 Likewise, use of an account
not directed toward Texas will not create general jurisdiction. For exam-
ple, a company will not be subject to general jurisdiction if it is a parent
company that uses its subsidiary's Texas account to conduct financial and
banking transactions, but does not possess an account itself.5' El Puerto
used the account directly to facilitate its business, and not to benefit cus-
tomers or third parties. Rather than a pass-through account, these trans-
actions included currency exchange, investments, debt service, and other
significant activities. 52 In finding general jurisdiction, however, the court
emphasized that it was not the bank activity alone, but El Puerto's total-
ity of contacts.
53
The court of appeals also found alter ego jurisdiction through El Pu-
erto's Texas subsidiaries, which include Operadora Liverpool and
Servicios Liverpool. Operadora is a Mexican corporation (with 99.9%
ownership by El Puerto) whose sole function is to provide services to El
Puerto, and it does so by owning stock in its own subsidiaries, which also
serve El Puerto. Operadora in turn owns all of Black Pool Trading Com-
pany and 99.9% of Distribuidora Liverpool's stock. The remaining
shares of Operadora and Distribuidora are held by other companies
owned by El Puerto. Distribuidora buys products for retail sale, and
Black Pool is a Texas corporation that acts as an "interchange company
for importation" for Distribuidora. Servisios Liverpool, El Puerto's other
direct subsidiary, provides personnel and the computer systems to this
group of organizations. The parties agreed that both Distribuidora and
Servicios do business in Texas and would be subject to jurisdiction here,
and, of course, Black Pool is incorporated here. When the elements that
justify disregarding corporate boundaries were applied, these facts were
sufficient to find El Puerto subject to alter ego jurisdiction for its subsidi-
aries' Texas activities. 54
The single-enterprise theory was El Puerto's third strike. Based on eq-
uity and partnership principles, the theory applies when corporations in-
tegrate resources to achieve a common purpose (as in a partnership)
rather than operating as separate entities. 55 Here, the companies share
employees, offices, and an accounting system, and four of the five compa-
nies share the business name "Liverpool." In addition, one company
50. Id. at 631 (quoting Primera Vista v. Banca Serfin, 974 S.W.2d 918, 926 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.)).
51. Preussag Aktiengesellschaft v. Coleman, 16 S.W.3d 110, 123-24 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied), cert. denied 536 U.S. 923 (2002).
52. El Puerto, 82 S.W.3d at 633.
53. Id.
54. "The operative question in a jurisdictional analysis is whether El Puerto's subsidi-
ary corporations are mere divisions or branches of a larger whole, such that the subsidiar-
ies' contacts with Texas should be attributed to El Puerto." Id. at 634. The court found no
formal barriers between the management of the separate entities and extensive overlap-
ping of officers and directors. Id. at 634-36.
55. Id. at 636-37.
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pays the salary for all the others, and all the companies provide services
to each other. El Puerto and Black Pool have directors but no employ-
ees, thus forming a functional whole.
56
Having found general jurisdiction through substantial banking activity,
not to mention alter ego subsidiaries, the court of appeals had no trouble
with the second portion of minimum contacts- the fair play and substan-
tial justice balancing test that measures the fairness of compelling a non-
resident to defend in a forum. 57 Once the contact is found, the defendant
has the burden of showing jurisdiction to be unreasonable; El Puerto
could not.
58
In Blair Communications v. SES Survey Equipment Services, Inc.,59 the
Houston Court of Appeals held that when the entire substance of a con-
tract is performed outside of Texas the contract will not satisfy the mini-
mum contact standard necessary to assert specific jurisdiction, even if the
nonresident defendant initiated contract discussions with a Texas resi-
dent, subsequently entered into a contract with that resident, and made
payments in Texas.
60
2. The Texas Long-Arm in Tort Cases
In American Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman,61 the Texas Su-
preme Court held that Texas lacked general jurisdiction over a non-profit
research group accused of selling pathogens later used in Iraq's biological
and chemical weapons during the Persian Gulf War. In 1994, Marshall
Coleman (presumably a Texas resident) filed a class action in Brazoria
County on behalf of 1,800 Gulf War veterans alleging that American Type
Culture Collection ("ATCC") and eighty-two other defendants sold ma-
terial, equipment and technology to Iraq that was used to create biologi-
cal and chemical weapons. The action raised claims of products liability
and negligence. ATCC contested jurisdiction.
ATCC is a nonprofit organized under the District of Columbia and
principally located in Maryland. It is a research organization and long-
term repository for living microorganisms, viruses and cell lines, and sells
materials to research institutes and commercial manufacturers in the
United States and forty-five other countries. Although it sold products in
Texas, the alleged harm did not arise from these Texas sales. Accord-
ingly, plaintiffs' jurisdictional argument rested on general jurisdiction, 62
56. Id. at 637.
57. See supra note 37 for the elements of the fair play and substantial justice test.
58. El Puerto, 82 S.W.2d at 638 (citing In re S.A.V., 837 S.W.2d 80, 85 (Tex. 1992);
Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 231)). El Puerto also moved for rehearing, and for rehear-
ing en banc of this decision based on the Texas Supreme Court's subsequent decision in
Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789. The court overruled the motions for rehearing since the decision
is in harmony with BMC. Id. at 638-39. See supra notes 37-45.
59. Blair Communications v. SES Survey Equip. Servs., 80 S.W.3d 723 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
60. Id.
61. Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801 (Tex. 2002).
62. Id. at 807.
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found to exist both in the trial court and the court of appeals. 63 On su-
preme court review, 64 the court considered the following jurisdictional
facts: ATCC advertises in national and international journals, and its cat-
alogues are sent only on request; a majority of its sales are made by
phone or written orders received in Maryland; ATCC's products are sent
F.O.B. Rockville, Maryland, which means that title passes at the desig-
nated F.O.B. point;65 and Maryland is the site of all invoices and
payments.66
As for its Texas contacts (at the time of the 1994 lawsuit), ATCC's
Texas sales dated back at least eighteen years and accounted for 3.5 per-
cent of its world-wide sales volume and five percent of its United States
total, creating approximately $350,000 in revenue. 67 ATCC is a reposi-
tory for Texas researchers seeking microorganism patents, and for the fif-
teen-to-twenty years prior to this suit, almost 2.7 percent of the 13,000
patents in ATCC's Maryland repository came from Texas residents. For
these services, customers shipped materials to Maryland, where ATCC
performed all its safe-deposit services. In 1991, ATCC contracted with
the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center to propogate and
test cell-lines. ATCC signed that agreement and performed all related
services in Maryland. 68 Over a five-year period, ATCC bought approxi-
mately $378,000 in supplies from thirty-three Texas vendors. Some of the
goods were sent F.O.B. Texas. From 1987 to 1994, ATCC personnel at-
tended five conferences in Texas, and in four had an exhibit booth and
distributed their publications.
69
The court of appeals had found that "ATCC's volume of Texas sales
was the 'bedrock' fact that supported jurisdiction. '70 The supreme court
disagreed, pointing to a Fifth Circuit case holding that sales exceeding $72
million that were "F.O.B. Wichita" did not support general jurisdiction. 71
General jurisdiction, the supreme court concluded, is premised on con-
sent, and consent is lacking "[w]hen a nonresident defendant purpose-
fully structures transactions to avoid the benefits and protections of a
forum's laws."'72 The supreme court then analyzed the two leading Su-
63. Am. Type Culture, Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 26 S.W.3d 37 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 2000), rev'd, 83 S.W.3d 801 (Tex. 2002).
64. The supreme court had appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal be-
cause of a dissenting opinion in the court of appeals's denial of the petition for en banc
rehearing. Am. Type Culture Collection, 83 S.W.3d at 805 (citing TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN.
§§ 22.001(a)(1) (Vernon 1988) & 22.225(c) (Vernon Supp. 2003)). The same issue arose in
Marchand, 83 S.W.3d at 793.
65. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d at 807 (citing CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex.
1996); and 10 WILLISrON ON CONTRACTS, § 1079A, at 94 n.6 (3d ed. 1967)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 804-05.
68. Id. at 807.
69. Id. at 808.
70. Id. at 808 (citing Am. Type Culture Collection, 26 S.W.3d at 53).




preme Court precedents-Perkins 73 and Helicopteros74-finding that
these facts far more resembled Helicopteros's denial of general jurisdic-
tion than Perkins's affirmance. ATCC does not advertise in Texas, has no
physical presence in Texas, performs no business services in Texas, and
carefully constructs its contracts to ensure that it does not benefit from
Texas laws.75 The court reversed, rendered, and dismissed.
7 6
3. Long-Arms in Federal Question Cases
Federal courts face the same limits as state courts in exercising personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents-it must be valid under both a long-arm
statute and due process. Federal courts ordinarily use the long-arm stat-
ute of the state in which they are located, but in a few instances use a
federal long-arm statute.
a. Texas Contacts-Federal Question Cases Applying the Texas
Long-Arm
Gonsalez Moreno v. Milk Train, Inc.77 is an action under the Migrant
and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act and related state law
claims for failing to disclose various job-related information, failing to
pay, and other violations. Plaintiffs are migrant farm workers residing
permanently in El Paso County, Texas. Defendant Milk Train is a New
York dairy, and defendant AG-Labor Services is a Texas farm labor con-
tracting agency. 78 In 1999 and 2000, AG recruited and hired plaintiffs
from El Paso County to work at the Milk Train's New York dairy. Plain-
tiffs signed the employment contracts in Texas before going to New York,
then returned to Texas in 2001 to sue in El Paso federal court. They al-
leged that defendants failed to disclose the availability of workers com-
pensation insurance, misrepresented job conditions, failed to comply with
the contract's terms regarding work arrangements, failed to pay wages,
and failed to provide wage receipts to one plaintiff.79 Defendant Milk
Train objected to Texas jurisdiction, invoked the contract's forum selec-
tion clause, and requested a § 1404 venue transfer.80
Plaintiffs alleged specific jurisdiction, based on Milk Train's recruit-
ment through AG. The district court noted that because Texas has a
"limits-of-due-process" long-arm, the only necessary inquiry was whether
73. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
74. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
75. Am. Type Culture Collection, 83 S.W.3d at 810. The court had earlier found that
ATCC is not authorized to do business in Texas; does not have officers, distributors, em-
ployees, real property or telephone listings in Texas; is neither required or has a registered
agent in Texas; does no unsolicited mailing to Texas; does no employee recruitment in
Texas; and does not advertise in Texas journals. Id. at 807.
76. Id. at 810.
77. Gonsalez Moreno v. Milk Train, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 590 (W.D. Tex. 2002).
78. Id. at 592.
79. Id. State claims included breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
and retaliatory discharge.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2003) is the intra-federal inconvenient forum transfer motion.
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due process, that is, minimum contacts, was satisfied. 81 Under specific
jurisdiction, the three part test was whether Milk Train had purposefully
directed its activities at Texas residents, whether the suit arose from those
forum activities, and whether the relation between the defendant, the fo-
rum, and the litigation offended "'traditional conceptions of fair play and
substantial justice.'"82
In a similar case, the Fifth Circuit had rejected jurisdiction over Ohio
defendants alleged to have violated federal employment laws. 83 There,
the Ohio defendants' only Texas contact was one telephone call and one
letter advising plaintiffs of the starting date for jobs they had accepted the
prior summer in Ohio.84 These facts stood in sharp contrast to the instant
case, where Milk Train had contacted AG to recruit Texas residents for
employment in New York and paid AG a contracting fee for each laborer
recruited. Plaintiffs signed the employment contracts in Texas, and Milk
Train dictated the terms and conditions. Milk Train paid the recruits' bus
fare to New York and advanced a sixty dollar travel loan. 85 These allega-
tions, if substantiated, amounted to an intentional tort in Texas, that is, a
jurisdictional contact. 86 After finding the contact, the fundamental fair-
ness test further affirmed jurisdiction. Milk Train had no substantial bur-
den in defending here, Texas had an interest in preventing its citizens
from exploitation by out-of-state employers,87 and the El Paso-based
plaintiffs would be inconvenienced by having to litigate in New York.
88
The district court denied Milk Train's objection to jurisdiction and also
denied objections regarding a forum selection clause,89 improper venue, 90
and a forum non conveniens transfer.91
Freudensprung v. Offshore Technical Services, Inc.92 presents an inter-
esting contrast to Gonsalez, with roughly similar facts. This was a Jones
Act claim for injuries on a derrick barge off the coast of Lagos, Nigeria.
Texas based Offshore Technical Services, Inc. (OTSI) contracted with
Willbros West Africa, Inc. (WWA) to supply personnel to work for WWA
81. Gonsalez Moreno, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 593 (citing Schlobom, 784 S.W.2d at 357, and
other cases interpreting the pertinent Texas long-arm statute, TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-.045).
82. Id. at 593-94 (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 464, 476-77 and other cases).
83. Aviles v. Kunkle, 978 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
84. Id. at 205.
85. Gonsalez Moreno, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 594. The court observed that the Texas long-
arm defined Milk Train's actions as doing business in this state by recruiting "Texas re-
sidents, directly or through an intermediary located in this state, for employment inside or
outside this state." Id. (citing TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042(3) (Vernon
1997)).
86. Id. at 594-95 (citing Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt, 195 F.3d 208, 213 (5th Cir.
1999)).
87. Id. at 595 (citing Astorga v. Connleaf, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 93, 96 (W.D. Tex. 1996)).
88. The court also analyzed the judicial system's interest in efficient resolution of con-
troversies and the shared interests of the several states in furthering fundamental substan-
tive social policies, and found them neutral in this case. Id. at 595-96 (citing various cases).
89. Id. at 596-97; see infra notes 189-94 and accompanying text.
90. Id. at 597.
91. Id. at 597-99.
92. Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Servs., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 716 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
2003] 1295
SMU LAW REVIEW
in Africa. The agreement required WWA to pay OTSI daily rates for
workers, all of whom remained OTSI employees while assigned to WWA.
OTSI hired Texas-resident Fred Freudensprung to work aboard a derrick
barge owned and operated by WWA. While working with a crew placing
large chains in the ocean floor, Freudensprung sustained severe physical
and mental injuries when a chain snapped, leaving him unable to work.
93
He sued OTSI, WWA, and its alleged parent company, Willbros Group,
Inc. Only WWA objected to jurisdiction.
WWA is a Panamanian corporation with its principal place of business
in Panama. Plaintiff argued that WWA's contacts with Texas justified
both specific and general jurisdiction, but the district court found Fifth
Circuit precedent indicating that neither was proper. For specific jurisdic-
tion, the district court noted that although WWA contracted both with
plaintiff and OTSI-both Texas residents-that "it is well established that
'merely contracting with a resident of the forum state is insufficient to
subject the nonresident to the forum's jurisdiction.' ' 94 Moreover, plain-
tiff was not WWA's employee, but only OTSI's. Plaintiff argued that the
contract contemplated arbitration in Houston, but that clause referred to
arbitration between WWA and OTSI.95 Plaintiff's third argument was
that WWA initiated and contemplated a long-term business arrangement
with OTSI, but performance would occur in Africa, thus failing to qualify
as purposeful availment. In finding specific jurisdiction lacking, the court
invoked two cases rejecting Texas jurisdiction where nonresident defend-
ants contracted with Texas residents, continued communications to Texas,
and sent money or products to Texas, and, in one case, contemplated the
application of Texas law.
96
Plaintiff's general jurisdiction argument was based only on WWA's
parent-WG-a Panamanian corporation based in Houston and signifi-
cantly active there. As noted elsewhere in this article, the requirement
for subjecting a parent or subsidiary corporation to alter ego jurisdiction
is severe.97 Plaintiff's allegation of two facts failed the test, and finding
neither specific nor general contacts, the fundamental fairness test was
unnecessary and WWA was dismissed from the suit.
98
93. Id. at 719.
94. Id. at 721 (quoting Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harvey, 801 F.2d 773, 778 (5th Cir.
1986)).
95. Id. at 722.
96. See Holt, 801 F.2d at 778; Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1193-1194 (5th Cir.
1985).
97. See discussion of alter ego jurisdiction in Marchand and El Puerto de Liverpool,
supra notes 37-57 and accompanying text.
98. Freudensprung, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 724. Plaintiff alleged that WG files a consoli-
dated financial statement that includes WWA's financial information, and that WG files a
consolidated tax return reflecting WWA's tax information. This failed the Fifth Circuit's
extensive test for alter ego jurisdiction, addressing (1) stock ownership, (2) headquarters
sharing, (3) officer and director sharing, (4) corporate formalities, (5) joint accounting, (6)
parent's authority over subsidiary's general policy, and (7) subsidiary authority over daily
operations. Id. at 723 (citing Hargrave v. Fibreboard, 710 F.2d 1154, 1160 (5th Cir. 1983)).
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b. Nationwide Contacts-Federal Question Cases Applying a
Federal Long-Arm
Management Insights, Inc. v. CIC Enterprises, Inc. ,99 is an example of a
federal long-arm restricted by a venue rule. Management Insights, Inc.
(MII) is a Texas corporation providing accounting services to Fortune
1000 companies. It sued CIC Enterprises, an Indiana competitor, for vio-
lations of the Lanham' 00 and Sherman' 0' Acts, and for state law claims of
slander tortious interference with contracts.' 0 2 These claims arose from
an alleged telephone conversation between CIC and one of MII's cus-
tomers in Tennessee, in which CIC's agent allegedly said that M11 was
discontinuing one of its primary services. CIC objected to Texas jurisdic-
tion. Plaintiff initially argued only for general and specific jurisdiction
under what the court termed a "traditional diversity analysis," that is, one
asserting personal jurisdiction under the forum state's long-arm stat-
ute.10 3 But, plaintiff's Sherman Act claim led to an additional argument
under the federal long-arm, which allowed for nationwide service of pro-
cess-the assertion of personal jurisdiction in a Texas federal court over
any defendant having minimum contacts with the nation as a whole.
The district court disposed of the state law claims by finding that (1)
CIC's post-filing telephone call to Texas could not be considered as a
basis for personal jurisdiction, 10 4 and (2) CIC's pre-lawsuit telephone call
to Tennessee allegedly causing damage in Texas failed the effects test.105
For general jurisdiction, plaintiff alleged continuous and systematic con-
tacts arising from (1) MII's (probably should be CIC's) relevant Texas
clients, (2) CIC's operation of a complaint line for Carl's Junior restau-
rants, some in Texas, (3) CIC's president's interaction with the Texas
members of a tax-related trade association, (4) plaintiff's (probably
should be defendant's) contacts with a federal agency in Dallas and state
agency in Austin regarding the certification of CIC's clients' eligibility for
a federal program, and (5) CIC's website, accessible by Texas re-
sidents. 106 These were not enough-CIC had "virtually no connection to
Texas," amounting to "'single or isolated items of activities. ' ' 0 7
99. Mgmt. Insights, Inc. v. CIC Enter., Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 520 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1997).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1997).
102. Mgmt. Insights, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 521.
103. Id. at 522-23.
104. Id. at 525 (citing Asarco, Inc. v. Glenara, Ltd., 912 F.2d 784, 787 n.1 (5th Cir.
1990)).
105. Id. at 525-26 (citing BeautiControl, Inc. v. Burditt, No. 3:01CV0744-M, 2001 WL
1149360, at *12 (N.D. Tex. 2001), and distinguishing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) in
that MII failed to show that CIC purposefully aimed its alleged tortious activity at Texas).
106. Id. at 526. Plaintiff's arguments (1) and (4) may be confusing, and the opinion
does not clarify why plaintiff's relevant contacts in Texas would subject an Indiana defen-
dant to Texas jurisdiction. This may be related to the nature of defamation claims, where
plaintiff must establish the local effect, but that would seem to only support specific juris-
diction and not general jurisdiction. On the other hand, the court's discussion of govern-
ment contacts suggests that plaintiff alleged CIC's contacts, not its own. Id. at 528-30.
107. Id. at 527 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).
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The antitrust claim required a different analysis. Sherman Act claims
are subject to the federal venue and long-arm provisions of section 12 of
the Clayton Act, providing that:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a cor-
poration may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is
an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or
transacts business; and all process in such cases may be served in the
district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found. 108
Plaintiff argued that the statute's venue clause is not a prerequisite to
its long arm clause, and of course, the defendant argued that it was. Just
as they were split, so are the circuits. In the Ninth Circuit, the Clayton
Act's venue provision is optional and may be supplanted by the general
venue provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1391.109 The opposite is true in the Sec-
ond Circuit and D.C. Circuit, where a suit must be filed in a federal dis-
trict where the defendant corporation resides or does business, before the
nationwide service of process clause is considered. 110 This court agreed
with the Second and D.C. Circuits, and accordingly found that because of
plaintiff's misplaced venue (in a district where CIC neither resided, was
found, nor did sufficient business I ), the nationwide contacts provision
did not apply, leaving no basis for jurisdiction under any of plaintiff's
claims.' 12
4. Internet Jurisdiction
Two Survey period cases reached opposite results in evaluating internet
activities as a basis for general jurisdiction. Experimental Aircraft Ass'n,
Inc. v. Doctor' 13 is an action for personal injury occurring at an air show
in Wisconsin. Laird Doctor became a quadriplegic when his aircraft col-
lided with another aircraft piloted by defendant Howard Pardue at the
annual convention of The Experimental Aircraft Association, Inc.,
("EAA"), held that year in Oshkosh, Wisconsin. Doctor and Pardue are
both from Texas. EAA's location is not mentioned, but it is not from
Texas. The trial court denied EAA's jurisdictional objection, holding that
it had waived its special appearance by filing an Agreed Motion for Con-
tinuance, and that EAA was subject to both specific and general
jurisdiction.' 14
108. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1997).
109. Mgmt. Insights, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 530 (citing Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885
F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1989)).
110. Id. at 530-31 (citing GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d
1343, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 288 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1961)).
111. Id. at 532-33 (noting that being "found" and "transacting business" required "a
substantial business activity ... with continuity of character, regularity, contemporaneous
with the service and not looking toward the cessation of business." Daniel v. Am. Bd. of
Emergency Med., 988 F. Supp. 127, 260 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)).
112. Id. at 533.
113. Experimental Aircraft Ass'n, Inc. v. Doctor, 76 S.W.3d 496 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
114. Id. at 501-02.
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On appeal, the Houston Court of Appeals held first that EAA did not
waive its jurisdictional challenge. 115 Turning to specific jurisdiction, the
court found that EAA had no related contacts in Texas, and that it had
not underwritten Pardue's performance in Wisconsin simply by reimburs-
ing his fuel expenses. Pardue was a volunteer, and "[b]ecause the acci-
dent in question occurred outside the state of Texas and the relationship
between EAA and Pardue did not rise to the level of an employment
contract, no evidence supports the trial court's finding of specific jurisdic-
tion." 1 6 But, the general jurisdiction analysis produced the opposite re-
sult. EAA had 9,000 Texas members, and because association
membership is a contract, "EAA thus has contractual agreements with
nearly 9000 separate Texas residents," 117 resulting in approximately
$350,000 in Texas dues revenue in 1999.118 EAA argued a Pennsylvania
precedent that declined jurisdiction over a nonresident trade association
with one member in the state (two percent) generating less than $8,000 in
dues income. The court distinguished this as factually inapposite, refer-
ring to the comparably large membership list and dues from Texas.119
In addition to Texas members, EAA marketed itself in Texas (1) by
holding an annual event known as the Southwest Regional Fly-In; (2) by
selling products in Texas, and (3) its website.120 Considering the website,
the court recited the sliding scale used to evaluate internet contacts.
At one extreme are entities clearly doing business over the internet by
entering contracts and repeatedly transmitting computer files. This re-
sults in jurisdiction in any state where that activity occurs. 121 At the other
extreme are passive web sites that merely post information on the in-
ternet, and here, personal jurisdiction would not be appropriate. 22 In
the middle are interactive websites that allow an exchange of information
between a potential customer and the host computer; courts evaluate
these cases on "the level of interactivity and the commercial nature of the
exchange of information.' 2 3
EAA was in the middle with an interactive site containing search capa-
bilities and an online shop with email purchasing capacity. The site has
hyperlinks to publicize EAA aviation events, as well as hyperlinks to lo-
cal chapters. The site promotes member benefits and allows joining by
email. Based on this, the court concluded that EAA's interactive com-
mercial website was "a significant factor in support of personal jurisdic-
115. Id. at 502 (citing Dawson-Austin v. Austin, 968 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. 1998)).
116. Id. at 505.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 506.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119,1124 (W.D.
Pa. 1997); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1265-66 (6th Cir. 1996)).
122. Id. at 506-07 (citing Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124; Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F.
Supp. 327, 334 (D.N.J. 1997)).
123. Id. at 507 (citing Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124).
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tion. ' '1 24 Combined with EAA's other marketing efforts in Texas and the
annual aviation show, and the relative fairness of requiring EAA to de-
fend in Texas, 125 the court found sufficient continuous and systematic
contacts to uphold the trial court's finding of general jurisdiction.'
26
Townsend v. University Hospital-University of Colorado 27 reached the
opposite result in a case where plaintiffs attempted general jurisdiction
over Colorado doctors and a hospital based for a patient's death there.
Julia Townsend Olivares was admitted to a Mesquite hospital for short-
ness of breath and coughing up blood, and a doctor there recommended
that she be airlifted to University Hospital in Denver, for care in its Pul-
monary Hypertension Center. She died there one week later. Her hus-
band and parents sued in Texas, naming the Mesquite doctor, the
Colorado doctors, and the hospital. The trial court sustained the Colo-
rado defendants' objection to jurisdiction, and the Texarkana Court of
Appeals affirmed. As to the Colorado defendants, the court found no
specific jurisdiction in that they had no relevant contacts with Texas and
all pertinent facts occurred in Colorado. 128 The court of appeals also re-
jected plaintiff's argument that the Mesquite doctor who recommended
transfer (and who had formerly worked at the Colorado hospital) was an
agent for the Colorado defendants. 1
29
Plaintiffs also argued that the Colorado defendants' website subjected
them to general jurisdiction in Texas. Applying the internet's sliding ju-
risdictional scale, the court found that none of the Colorado doctors ad-
vertised on the website, which only had contact information and was not
used to conduct business. Because contact and product information
alone is not sufficient,130 the court concluded that none of the defendants
was conducting business in Texas.
5. In Rem Jurisdiction
The Survey period had no in rem cases involving property in Texas and
implicating other jurisdictions. It did, however, have one case in which a
Texas court of appeals rejected a Mexican court's assertion of in rem ju-
risdiction in a dispute involving a house in Acapulco. In Brosseau v.
Ranzau,'3 1 the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that it had jurisdiction
to decide ownership of one share of stock in a Canadian corporation
known simply as "80451," whose sole function was the ownership of a
124. Id.
125. The court held that EAA "had not demonstrated that it would be put to a substan-
tial burden in order to defend itself in this forum." Id. at 508. The court further pointed
out that EAA has over fifty chapters in the state and thirteen agents traveling on their
behalf. Id.
126. Id.
127. Townsend v. Univ. Hosp.-Univ. of Colo., 83 S.W.3d 913 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2002, pet. denied).
128. Id. at 920-21.
129. Id. at 921.
130. Id. at 922 (citing Mink v. AAAA Dev. L.L.C., 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999)).
131. Brosseau v. Ranzau, 81 S.W.3d 381 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, pet. denied).
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house in Acapulco, Mexico known as Casa T. The court of appeals de-
nied preclusive effect to the resulting Mexican judgment and character-
ized the dispute as involving personal property, based on the corporation




Status jurisdiction is a special category recognizing a state's authority
to adjudicate issues such as marital status, parental custody, and mental
competence. It is often characterized as subject matter jurisdiction but
turns on amenability factors such as contacts with the forum state. Com-
petence determinations do not often implicate interstate issues, and mari-
tal status litigation still tends to tolerate parallel suits in different states
and countries. The pervasive problem exists with child custody determi-
nations-both original and modifications-where conflicting judgments
and parental abduction create problems. The solution has been legisla-
tion in the form of uniform acts or treaties designed to choose a single
custody forum that other states will respect. Domestically, the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) 133 and the
federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)134 seek to establish
unitary child custody jurisdiction and apply full faith and credit to those
decisions. Internationally, the UCCJEA governs both jurisdictional dis-
putes and decree enforcement, 35 and is joined by the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act 136 ("ICARA," the United States version of the
Hague Convention on Child Abduction137), which seeks the return of
children taken both within the United States and across international
borders in violation of valid custody orders. These Acts often involve
judgment enforcement and preclusion, but are discussed here because
they also involve questions of status jurisdiction.
a. Interstate Custody Disputes
The Survey period produced four interstate UCCJEA decisions, two
construing the Act's recently-revised concept of retained jurisdiction af-
ter the child has moved to another state. The Texarkana Court of Ap-
peals was the first to apply the new rule in In re Bellamy.138 Cindy and
Dan Bellamy divorced, unaware of Cindy's pregnancy with Danielle. Al-
though Dan became active with Danielle from birth, he apparently did
132. See infra notes 482-507 and accompanying text.
133. TEX. FAM. COD. ANN. §§ 152.101-317 (Vernon 2002).
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
135. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.105 (Vernon 2002). The PKPA does not apply to
child custody conflicts with foreign countries.
136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (1995).
137. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, opened
for signature Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, 19 I.L.M. 1501-15 (1980) (en-
tered into force Dec. 1, 1983) [hereinafter Hague Convention].
138. In re Bellamy, 67 S.W.3d 482 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.)
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not pay child support and, in 1996, the Texas Attorney General sought to
change that by filing suit in Cass County to declare Dan the father and
require child support. The court complied and awarded the parents joint
custody with Cindy as the primary possessor. 139 In 2000, the Attorney
General sued Dan again, this time to increase child support. Dan
counter-petitioned to modify custody, and when the Attorney General
nonsuited, only Dan's claim remained. Although it is unclear when
Cindy and Danielle moved, at this point they had lived in Louisiana for
some time, clearly more than the six months necessary to establish a new
home state. Cindy accordingly asked the Texas court to decline custody
jurisdiction over the now-nonresident Danielle. Instead, the court of ap-
peals awarded Dan primary possession and the sole right to determine
residence, but continued both parents as joint managing conservators.140
Cindy appealed her jurisdictional objection, claiming Louisiana as home
state and arguing alternatively that Texas either had to decline jurisdic-
tion because it was no longer the home state, or that it had a less signifi-
cant connection than Louisiana under the new UCCJEA. 141
Texas law is contradictory on the retention of child custody jurisdiction
when the home state changes. Under section 155.003 of the Texas Family
Code, which existed prior to the UCCJEA and has not been repealed,
Texas loses custody jurisdiction when it is no longer the child's home
state, 142 defined by the child living in a state with a parent or a person
acting as parent for at least six months.' 43 But the new UCCJEA pro-
vides that once establishing original jurisdiction, Texas retains jurisdiction
as long as it has a significant connection with the child. 144 The court of
appeals ruled that the newer section 152.202 had priority over section
155.003 (thus ruling against Cindy's argument that Texas necessarily lost
jurisdiction. But, Cindy still had an argument that under section 152.202,
Texas had too little continuing connection to Danielle. The court of ap-
peals again disagreed. Although Danielle lived in Louisiana, she at-
tended school in Texas and lived only a few miles from her maternal
grandparents' home in Texas. In addition, the court found a strong per-
sonal relationship between Danielle and her father, stepmother and step-
brothers in Texas, and other evidence of a continuing connection here.145
In re McCormick146 reiterated Bellamy's conclusion in a case where the
father and child had not yet established a new home state in Kansas.
Dale McCormick and Sharlet Wilks divorced in Parmer County in 1995,
with Sharlet named managing conservator of their son, Levi. But in Sep-
tember 2000, Levi began living with his father Dale in Clovis, New Mex-
139. Id. at 483.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 483, 485.
142. TEX. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 155.003(b)(1) (Vernon 2002).
143. TEX. FAM. CoiE ANN. § 152.102(7) (Vernon 2002).
144. Id. § 152.202.
145. Bellamy, 67 S.W.3d at 485.
146. In re McCormick, 87 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.).
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ico, only a few miles from Parmer County. On Sept. 19, 2000, the
Amarillo Court of Appeals entered a temporary restraining order di-
recting Sharlet not to remove Levi from Dale's possession, and on Octo-
ber 19, Dale was named managing conservator with the right to establish
Levi's primary residence. In September 2001, Dale and Levi moved to
Kansas.
147
Sharlet asked the Texas court to modify custody again and re-name her
as managing conservator. Dale responded with a plea to jurisdiction
seeking to have the custody forum changed to Kansas under the
UCCJEA, 48 making Cindy Bellamy's argument under section 152.202
that Texas should decline ongoing custody jurisdiction because Levi had a
new home state and no longer had a significant connection to Texas. 149
The trial court disagreed and retained jurisdiction. The court of appeals
affirmed, based on Sharlet's continuing presence in Texas and several
other factors relating to Dale's New Mexico residence and problems ap-
parent in his move to Kansas.' 50 The court reached this decision in spite
of Levi's now-strong connection to Kansas, where he lived across the
street from Dale's parents and within forty miles of Dale's extended fam-
ily. Levi had also engaged in predictable activities there and was active in
both school and church programs. 151 The decision here illustrates the
new UCCJEA's strong preference for the original forum-the connective
strength of the new home state does not compel the original forum to
decline jurisdiction, and while the original forum has discretion to decline
if it finds that another state has a more significant connection to the child,
the original forum is the sole authority determining the issue as long as
the child, or either parent, or any person acting as parent remains in
Texas.
152
In re Brilliant153 involved a less-than-six-month residence in Texas that,
nonetheless, led to jurisdiction. The mother, father, and child were re-
sidents of Massachusetts who relocated to Texas. The mother-Kristen
Fox-conceived Kaylee Lynn-Marie Brilliant in 1998, while still in high
school in Massachusetts, and never married the father, Reginald (Regi)
147. Id. at 748.
148. Id.
149. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.202 (Vernon 2002).
150. The court cited Dale's earlier nearby residence in Clovis; Dale's failure to give
Sharlet notice of his move to Kansas; the less-than-six-month presence in Kansas at the
time of the Texas filing (on this point the court referred to Bellamy's recent decision that
the UCCJEA had priority over Tex. Fam. Code § 155.003; see 87 S.W.3d at 750 (citing
Bellamy, 67 S.W.3d at 484)); the domestic abuse complaint filed by Dale's current wife
when they were still living in Clovis; Dale's mental disorder; Dale's having hidden Levi
from Sharlet; and Dale's failure to keep Levi's appointments with the court-ordered coun-
selor. Bellamy, 87 S.W.3d at 749-51.
151. Id. at 750.
152. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.202 provides that either a Texas court or a court of
another state may modify an original Texas custody order if such court "determines that
the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as parent do not presently reside in this
state." Id. § 152.202(a)(2). In all other instances, Texas retains exclusive jurisdiction. Id.
§ 152.202(a).
153. In re Brilliant, 86 S.W.3d 680 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.).
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Brilliant. When Kristen was six months pregnant, Regi returned to his
home in El Paso while Kristen stayed in Massachusetts to finish high
school. She and Kaylee then joined Regi in El Paso. When Kristen soon
decided to return to Massachusetts, Regi obtained a temporary re-
straining order prohibiting Kaylee's removal from Texas and asking for
her custody. Although properly served, Kristen took Kaylee back to
Massachusetts.'
54
Kristen filed a plea to jurisdiction to the El Paso action but defaulted
when she failed to appear at a hearing. 155 The court of appeals reversed
and found that while the default should be set aside for lack of notice to
Kristen, Texas did have child custody jurisdiction. 156 Although Kaylee
had not lived in Texas the required six months at the time of Regi's initial
filing, Texas nonetheless had priority jurisdiction over Massachusetts be-
cause all concerned parties had left Massachusetts and relocated to Texas
when the El Paso action was filed.157 Kristen argued that her Texas pres-
ence was temporary, but the court disagreed based on her signing the
lease in El Paso and filling out job applications. 158
In an unpublished UCCJEA opinion, the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals held that a mother's appeal of the denial of a protective order in
Texas was mooted by a California court's assertion of child custody juris-
diction. Kovatch v. Juarez159 was an application for protective order that
Jennifer Kovatch filed after fleeing from California to San Antonio, seek-
ing to restrain Francisco Juarez from bothering her or her two children.
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order and set a hearing
date for a protective order. Francisco contested personal jurisdiction, ar-
guing that he had never lived in Texas, had not been served with process
here, and had committed no wrongful act here. 60 Jennifer argued that
the UCCJEA's temporary emergency jurisdiction provisions applied, 161
but the trial court disagreed when Francisco testified that he had filed a
paternity and custody suit in California and that a hearing had been
set. 162 The court of appeals affirmed, finding the case moot based on
Jennifer's return to California after the trial court's denial. The court
found that the need for any such relief now was speculative. 163
154. Id. at 683.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 693.
157. Id. at 689-92.
158. Id. at 689-90.
159. Kovatch v. Juarez, No. 04-01-00477-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio May 22, 2002,
no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 1021645.
160. Id. at *1.
161. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.204(a) (Vernon 2002).
162. Kovatch, 2002 WL 1021645, at *1.
163. Id. (citing Speer v. Presbyterian Children's Home & Serv. Agency, 847 S.W.2d 227,
229 (Tex. 1993) (no authority to render advisory opinions); FDIC v. Nueces County, 886
S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex. 1994) (actual controversy must exist); Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d
171, 184 (Tex. 2001) (must be a live controversy)).
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b. International Custody Disputes
In re Calderon-Garza demonstrated the UCCJEA's international di-
mension. 164 The case began in medical school in Guadalajara in 1997,
where Veronica Maria Caldron-Garza met Medhi Farshad Derambakhsh.
Veronica became pregnant in April 2000, and in January 2001, traveled to
her parents' home in El Paso, Texas, where Diego Andres Calderon was
born on January 27. Veronica did not dispute that Medhi was the father,
but refused to sign the paternity acknowledgment he had requested. She
left El Paso to return to Guadalajara, and the next day Medhi filed a
paternity action in an El Paso court. 165 After being served by substituted
service, Veronica objected to her own personal jurisdiction and to the
court's subject matter jurisdiction over Diego. The associate judge sus-
tained her objections and dismissed, but the district court disagreed and
found jurisdiction over mother and child. 166
On appeal, the issue was whether Texas was Diego's home state. Juris-
diction in Texas required that Texas be the home state on the date of the
commencement of the proceeding, a date by which mother and child had
returned to Guadalajara. But, "home state" is defined as "the state in
which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least
six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child
custody proceeding.' 67 Moreover, for children under six months old,
"home state" is "the state in which the child lived from birth with a par-
ent or a person acting as parent. ' 168 Thus, there was a statutory con-
flict-was Diego's home state where he lived on the date of the filing
(Mexico), or for the period immediately preceding it (Texas)? The court
construed these sentences to mean that "in order to determine a child's
home state on a particular date, we must ask where the child lived imme-
diately before that date. '169 With this interpretation, the court had no
problem affirming that Texas was Diego's home state on the date the
father filed his paternity action, because he had lived here from birth and
had not established a home state elsewhere at that point. 170 The court
also found that whether the mother was amenable or not, Diego's cus-
tody could be decided here.
17'
164. In re Calderon-Garza, 81 S.W.3d 899 (Tex. App-El Paso 2002, no pet.). At the
outset of its analysis of this Texas-Mexico conflict, the court of appeals stated that the
UCCJEA has "international application to child custody proceedings and determinations
of other countries; thus Mexico will be treated as if it were a state of the United States for
purposes of applying the Act." Id. at 902 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.105; also
citing SAMPSON & TIDAL, TEXAS FAMILY CODE ANN. § 152.105, Commissioners' Com-
ment p. 472 (2001)).
165. Id. at 901.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 902 (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.201 (Vernon Supp. 2002)).
168. Id. (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.102(7) (Vernon Supp. 2002)).
169. Id. at 903.




The Survey period also produced one Hague Convention, or ICARA
case. For this case discussion, "Hague Convention" will be used for the
treaty's broader application in several countries, and "ICARA" will be
used for specific references to the treaty's United States version. Velez v.
Mitsak172 involved a mother's abduction of a child from Spain to Texas in
violation of an Italian custody order. Maria Esperanza Velez and Charles
Mitsak are U.S. citizens who taught in Europe with the United States
Department of Defense. Their common law marital status is unclear.
Ezra Mitsak was born in 1997, in El Paso, Texas (the mother's home), and
the parents thereafter worked and lived together in Spain. They sepa-
rated in early 1999, and the mother moved with Ezra from Spain to Italy.
Charles claimed ignorance of their whereabouts, but Maria alleged he
knew that she had been transferred to Italy. The mother also alleged that
Charles had abused Ezra and her.
17 3
Charles filed for Ezra's custody in a Spanish court, which, interestingly,
gave custody to Maria, although she was unaware of it until much later.
74
Immediately after the Spanish custody decision, Charles filed a Hague
Convention request in an Italian court and obtained an order for Ezra's
return to Spain. It is unclear why Charles would seek to enforce a Span-
ish decree that did not award him custody, but this may be explained by
Maria's allegation that Charles obtained the Italian order by fraud.
1 75
This was further clouded by Charles's contention that the first Spanish
decree had been vacated, and Maria's contention that she was seeking to
overturn the Italian order and pursuing further action in Spain.
176
Following the Italian decree favoring Charles, Maria left Italy with
Ezra for Mexico, where Charles filed another Hague request for Ezra's
return.17 7 Maria and Ezra then returned to El Paso and Charles followed
with yet another Hague request, filed under ICARA. In the El Paso
claim, Charles did not allege an outright custody right but merely right of
access. 178 The El Paso trial court found in Charles's favor in spite of Ma-
ria's argument that Charles had obtained the Italian order by fraud, and
now submitted erroneous translations.179 The trial court based its deci-
sion on a misreading of ICARA and on a letter from the United States
Central Authority advising of Spain's request for the child's return. 80
172. Valez v. Mitsak, 89 S.W.3d 73 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002), rev'd on other grounds
and remanded, 89 S.W.3d 84.
173. Id. at 75.
174. Id.
175. Id. On the other hand, the father may simply have been seeking to enforce his
possessory rights, as he sought in the El Paso case.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 75-76.
179. Id. at 77.
180. The Hague Convention uses the concept of a "central authority" in each signatory
country. See Hague Convention, supra note 136, arts. 6 & 7. See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 11606
(1995 & Supp. 2003) for the United States's ICARA version. These central authorities are
instructed to cooperate to achieve the Convention's goals by (1) discovering the child's
whereabouts; (2) preventing further harm to the child; (3) securing the child's voluntary
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The trial court thus ruled for Charles without hearing evidence on Ma-
ria's objections.
The El Paso Court of Appeals reversed. It found that the trial court
erred both in its summary proceeding and in giving the Italian decree full
faith and credit. The court of appeals noted the confusion in the Hague
Convention's implementing legislation in the United States, in which it
requires that "[f]ull faith and credit shall be accorded by the courts of the
States and the courts of the United States to the judgment of any other
such court.' 181 The trial court had applied this provision to find that
courts in the United States owed full faith and credit to foreign custody
decrees, but the court of appeals concluded that any other such court re-
ferred only to courts in the United States, and that foreign custody de-
crees were entitled only to comity.182 And while comity might
nonetheless be sufficient to honor the Italian decree, it did not compel a
summary proceeding that cut off the mother's right to challenge underly-
ing fraud in the Italian decree.' 83 The court accordingly reversed the trial
court's enforcement of the foreign decree and remanded for a new hear-
ing, recognizing that although Charles and Ezra had left Texas, these er-
rors required addressing. 184
C. REASONS FOR DECLINING OTHERWISE VALID JURISDICTION
Even where all jurisdictional elements exist, courts may refrain from
litigating cases contractually structured for other forums, or that would be
better brought in another forum, that are currently being litigated in an-
other court, or that have reached final judgment in another forum. These
instances may be broadly grouped in three settings: (1) forum selection
clauses that derogate from Texas jurisdiction, (2) forum non conveniens
motions, and (3) parallel lawsuits leading to possible transfer, stay, or an-
tisuit injunction.
1. Derogating Forum Selection Clauses
The Consent section above discusses forum selection clauses that estab-
lish local jurisdiction. 18 5 Somewhat different considerations arise when
the plaintiff sues in a forum contrary to the parties' earlier choice in a
and amicable return, (4) exchanging information, (5) providing information regarding that
state's custody laws, (6) providing legal assistance, if necessary; and (7) informing other
contracting states of any obstacles. Hague Convention, supra note 136, art. 6 & 7. This
function does not circumvent any party's due process rights, or any other rights to chal-
lenge foreign custody decrees.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(g) (1995) (emphasis added), quoted in Velez, 89 S.W.3d at 81.
182. The court drew authority from Ibarra's legislative history, see 89 S.W.3d at 81-82
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 10-525, at 12 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 386, 393-94).
The court also referred to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 98 cmt. b, for
the proposition that foreign country judgments are not entitled to full faith and credit.
Velez, 89 S.W.3d at 82.
183. Id. at 83.
184. Id. at 84.
185. See supra notes 20-29, especially the sources cited in note 20.
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forum selection clause. These are known as derogation clauses (in regard
to that forum), and instead of justifying the court's retention of the case,
require the court to consider declining its otherwise valid jurisdiction
over the parties. Two Texas federal courts rejected derogation clauses in
the Survey period.
In Psarros v. Avior Shipping, Inc.,186 the court rejected the forum
clause in a seaman's employment contract because his action was for per-
sonal injury and the forum clause's language was directed only to tort.
Specifically, the forum clause stated that "[i]t is mandatory that any disa-
greement arising from the enforcement of this contract will be resolved in
the Greek Courts, explicitly excluding the Seaman from seeking recourse
in the Courts of the U.S.A. or in the Courts of any other country besides
Greece. '187 As more fully discussed below, 188 Psarros was severely in-
jured while his ship was docking in the Port of Houston, and his resulting
claim was against several defendants located in the United States and
Panama. The only connection to Greece was that it was plaintiff's home,
where he was hired and where he recuperated. In rejecting the forum
clause, the court stated that "when a forum selection clause is limited to
matters of contract interpretation or enforcement alone, it is inapplicable
to litigation arising from torts committed in the course of the contractual
relationship."
189
In Gonsalez-Moreno v. Milk Train, Inc.,' 90 the district court rejected a
forum selection clause as statutorily unenforceable. This was an action by
farm workers from El Paso who had been hired to work at a New York
dairy. They sued in federal court in El Paso under the Migrant and Sea-
sonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act (AWPA), 191 with related state
law claims regarding fraud and breach of contract. Their contracts had a
clause requiring suits arising on the contract to be brought in New York.
Although the Fifth Circuit has not yet decided whether a forum clause
should be analyzed as (1) a limit to personal jurisdiction, (2) a venue des-
ignation, or (3) a foundation for a motion for forum non conveniens
transfer, 92 the question was unnecessary because this clause was barred
186. Psarros v. Avior Shipping, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 751 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
187. Id. at 752.
188. See infra notes 241-52 and accompanying text.
189. Psarros, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 753-54 (citing Marinechance Shipping, Ltd. v. Sebas-
tian, 143 F.3d 216, 222 (5th Cir. 1988) (Marinechance quotation omitted); and Manetti-
Farrow v. Gucci Am., 858 F.2d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 1988) (Manetti-Farrow quotation
omitted)).
190. Gonsalez-Moreno v. Milk Train, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 590 (W.D. Tex. 2002).
191. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 (1999).
192. Gonsalez-Moreno, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 597 (citing Haynsworth v. The Corp., 121
F.3d 956, 961 (5th Cir. 1997). Characterizing a forum clause as a matter of personal juris-
diction, venue, or forum non conveniens may depend in part on whether the clause is being
used to establish the forum's jurisdiction (a prorogation clause), or defeat it (a derogation
clause). Derogation clauses (those pointing to another forum) are often treated as matters
of venue or forum non conveniens because they require no jurisdictional analysis, but in-
stead merely construe the validity of the forum clause. See Parallel Litigation, supra note
20 at 912-38. On the other hand, prorogation clauses (affirming a nonresident's amenabil-
ity to the instant forum) require an analysis not only of the clause's validity and meaning,
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by federal law. Specifically, the AWPA provides that "[a]greements by
employees purporting to waive or modify their rights under this chapter
shall be void as contrary to public policy."'1 93 Instead, the AWPA allows
migrant workers to sue in "any district in the United States having juris-
diction of the parties. ' 194 The court accordingly rejected defendant's fo-
rum clause objection.
195
2. Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals
Forum non conveniens, or inconvenient forum, is an old common law
objection to jurisdiction that now is also available by statutes such as 28
U.S.C. § 1404 for intra-jurisdictional transfers based on convenience.' 96
Because intra-jurisdictional transfers do not implicate conflicts between
states or nations, they are not considered here. This article is limited to
common law inter-jurisdictional forum non conveniens, available in state
and federal courts in Texas under the same two-part test requiring mo-
vant to show the availability of an adequate alternative forum, and that a
balancing of private and public interests favors transfer. 197
The Survey period produced five noteworthy forum non conveniens
decisions, two considering the important issue of the foreign forum's ade-
quacy, and three involving car accidents in Mexico (including two Fire-
stone claims). The first case is from the Fifth Circuit and considers
important questions about the foreign remedy's adequacy. Gonzalez v.
but of it's legal ability to create personal jurisdiction in the absence of other contacts. If
this explanation seems to draw distinctions where there are none, see Alexander Proudfoot
Co. World Headquarters, L.P. v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1989). See also Paral-
lel Litigation, supra note 20 at 938-41.
193. 29 U.S.C. § 1856 (1999).
194. Id. at § 1854(a).
195. Gonsalez-Moreno, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 596-97.
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 is the federal statutory provision for inconvenient forum objec-
tions seeking transfer to another federal court. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404 (West 1993 & Supp.
2002). Texas law provides for in-state venue transfers based on convenience under TEX.
Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(b) (Vernon 2002).
197. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235 (1981); McLennan v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., Inc., 245 F.3d 403, 423-24 (5th Cir.
2001). The private factors look to the parties' convenience, and include the relative ease of
access to sources of proof, the availability of compulsory process for the attendance of
unwilling witnesses, and the cost of obtaining their attendance; the possibility of viewing
the premises, if appropriate; and all other practical problems that make the trial easy, ex-
peditious, and inexpensive. McLennan, 245 F.3d at 424. The public factors look to the
courts concerns and the forum state's interests, and include the "administrative difficulties
flowing from court congestion; the local interest in having localized controversies decided
at home; the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum familiar with the law
that must govern the action; the avoidance of unnecessary conflict of laws problems.., and
the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty." Id. (quoting
Dickinson Marine, Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 342 (5th Cir. 1999). Texas forum
non conveniens law is multi-faceted. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051
(Vernon Supp. 2003) applies to personal injury and wrongful death claims. TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.052 (Vernon Supp. 2003) applies to asbestosis claims filed
by persons not residing in Texas at the time their claims arose. Common law forum non
conveniens, in line with Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, governs all other interstate and international
forum convenience issues in Texas state courts. See In re Smith Barney, Inc., 975 S.W.2d
593, 596 (Tex. 1998).
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Chrysler Corp.,198 is a wrongful death claim for a three-year-old boy
killed when an air bag deployed in a collision in Atizapan de Zaragoza,
Mexico. The parents sued in Texas, naming Chrysler and other defend-
ants connected to the air bag's manufacture and the trial court granted
defendants' forum non conveniens motion. The appeal focused on plain-
tiffs' objections to the adequacy of the remedy in Mexico. Apparently
because of the remedy-adequacy issue, the court reconfigured the Fifth
Circuit's usual two-part forum non conveniens test as a four-part test:
First, is an alternative forum available? Second, is the alternative forum
adequate? Third, do the private interests favor dismissal? Fourth, do the
public interests favor dismissal? 199 Plaintiffs' objections to forum ade-
quacy in Mexico are drawn from Justice Marshall's explanation in Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, stating that a foreign forum is ordinarily adequate
if defendants are amenable to process there, but that in rare circum-
stances, a clearly unsatisfactory remedy would render a forum inade-
quate.200 Plaintiffs argued that a Mexican court was unsatisfactory
because (1) Mexican tort law has no applicable strict liability remedy, and
(2) Mexican law caps damages for a child's wrongful death at approxi-
mately $2,500, based on 730 days of minimum wages.
20t
The Fifth Circuit disposed of plaintiffs' first argument by invoking
plaintiffs' cited case, Piper. Piper held that the unavailability of strict lia-
bility in Scotland did not make the forum inadequate.20 2 Plaintiffs' sec-
ond objection-the $2,500 damages cap-was "slightly more
problematic. ' 20 3 This objection had two components: first, the recovery
would be de minimis, and second, because the litigation cost would ex-
ceed the potential recovery, the lawsuit would never be brought in Mex-
ico. As to de minimis recovery, the court held that however
unsatisfactory it might seem, the damages cap was Mexico's policy deci-
sion, meant to apply to plaintiffs and not to be second-guessed by an
American court.20 4 The court acknowledged that economic realities gov-
ern cases,205 and, pointing to the defendants' concession at oral argument
that the case would never be filed in Mexico, recognized that a forum non
conveniens dismissal meant judgment for defendants. Nonetheless, the
court found that it could not engage in damage-cap line drawing, 20 6 and
198. Gonzalez v. Chrysler Corp., 301 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 2002).
199. Id. at 379-80 (citing various cases). The Fifth Circuit is often cited as having a two
part test: the availability of an adequate alternative forum, and the balancing of public and
private factors. See infra note 196.
200. Id. at 380 (quoting Piper, 454 U.S. 235, 255 n.22 (1981)).
201. Id. at 380-81.
202. Id. at 381 (citing Piper, 454 U.S. at 255).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 381-82.
205. The court listed four factors that might affect a party's willingness to sue: (1)
whether plaintiff's injuries are compensable in that forum; (2) not whether the forum rec-
ognizes some cause of action, but whether it recognizes plaintiff's most provable and com-
pensable claim; (3) whether the forum recognizes defenses that might bar or diminish




held that not only was Mexico an adequate forum, but that "the adequacy
inquiry under Piper Aircraft does not include an evaluation of whether it
makes economic sense" to file a lawsuit in the alternative forum. 20 7 Once
the court resolved the forum adequacy issue, it dispensed with the public-
private factor balancing by deferring to the trial court's decision favoring
Mexico.2
08
Gonzales v. P. T. Pelangi Niagra Mitra International,20 9 also considered
the important issue of forum adequacy. Ecuadoran plaintiff Gonzales
was rendered a quadriplegic when working on a barge operated offshore
from Indonesia. By the time of the lawsuit, he and his wife lived in Hous-
ton where he had moved for therapy.210 Gonzales and his wife sued sev-
eral defendants in federal court in Galveston, who, in turn, moved for a
forum non conveniens dismissal in favor of litigation in Indonesia. Plain-
tiffs' strongest objection was the alleged corruption of the Indonesian ju-
dicial system, substantiated by "voluminous proof . . . including
newspaper articles, statements by prominent Indonesian politicians, the
results of a survey conducted by the Partnership for Governance Reform
in Indonesia, a World Bank report and statements by the United States
government. 2 11 The court found this argument inadequate for two rea-
sons. First, there was no case law support for concluding that a foreign
forum was corrupt. 212 Second, the court "refuse[d] to sit in judgment
upon the integrity of the entire Indonesian judiciary. ' 213 The court then
analyzed the public and private factors, and because they significantly
pointed to Indonesia, the court granted defendants' motion.214
207. Id.
208. Id. at 383-84. The public/private factors conclusion is not controversial considering
the case's significant contacts with Mexico, and the fact that the American contacts (with
defendant manufacturers) did not involve Texas. The only Texas contact was that the fa-
ther had shopped for the car in Houston, although his purchase occurred in Mexico. Id. at
379.
209. Gonzales v. P.T. Pelangi Niagra Mitra Int'l, 196 F. Supp. 2d 482 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
210. Id. at 485.
211. Id. at 487.
212. Id. at 488. To the contrary, the court found several sources refusing to act on
allegations of bias or corruption in foreign courts. Id. The court citied six cases rejecting
such allegations, but finding one that held that movant "failed to meet its burden of show-
ing that Bolivia was an adequate forum where plaintiff produced strong supporting [evi-
dence] of serious partiality and manipulation there." Id. (citing Eastman Kodak, Co. v.
Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1087 (S.D. Fla. 1997)).
213. Gonzales, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 488 (citing several cases). The court had foreshad-
owed this conclusion when it commented that "[ain adequate forum need not be a perfect
forum." Id. at 486 (citing Satz v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 244 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir.
2001)). The court concluded that "a foreign forum qualifies as inadequate only when it
amounts to 'no remedy at all."' Id. (quoting Piper, 454 U.S. at 254). Note that it was
defendants' burden to show the Indonesian forum to be adequate. They did so with an
affidavit from an Indonesian lawyer stating that Indonesian law provides analogous causes
of action and adequate remedies for plaintiffs' claims, which would not be barred by limita-
tions, and that Indonesian law allows contingency fees. Id. at 487.
214. Id. at 490-91. The only pertinent American connections were plaintiffs' post-acci-




The first of two Firestone cases also raises an important question-how
do you protect a forum non conveniens dismissal when plaintiffs can sim-
ply file again in another Texas court? Vasquez v. Bridgestone/ Firestone,
Inc.,215 was one of four lawsuits arising from a single-car accident in
Nuevo Leon, Mexico in 1999. Six passengers died when a tire apparently
blew out on a Chevrolet Suburban carrying employees back from a train-
ing session. On March 15, 2000, five decedents' spouses filed the first of
at least four Texas actions against Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., and other
defendants, but omitted car-manufacturer General Motors Corporation.
Soon after the sixth victim's survivor intervened, the court dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.216 On January 19, 2001, all six spouses sued in state
district court in Orange County, Texas, this time including General Mo-
tors. Defendants removed this action to federal district court, which dis-
missed on forum non conveniens grounds on August 7, 2001,217 based on
(1) Mexico's relationship to the events and Texas's lack of one,218 (2) the
applicability of Mexican law,219 and (3) the availability of an adequate
remedy in Mexico's courts. 220 The court also noted that a plaintiff's
choice of forum is entitled to less deference when a foreign plaintiff is
trying to avail herself of more-favorable law in the United States.
221
Two lawsuits were now resolved, but two remained. Three plaintiffs
had sued in state district court in Cameron County on February 21, 2001,
and all six had sued in state court in Webb County on August 20, 2001,
thirteen days after the second court's conveniens dismissal.222 To counter
these additional suits, defendants returned to the second court (the one
granting the forum non conveniens dismissal) and requested an anti-suit
injunction to stop plaintiffs from further litigation in Texas courts. In
considering the injunction, the federal court had to review the federal
Anti-Injunction Act's strong restrictions on federal courts' enjoining state
court litigation.223 This case, however, neatly fit into one of the Act's
three exceptions-injunctions to protect or effectuate federal judgments,
215. Vasquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. Tex. 2001).
216. Id. at 732. Vasquez does not state the basis of the other court's jurisdictional dis-
missal and does not cite the case.
217. Id. at 732.
218. Id. at 733. The one-car accident occurred in Mexico, in a car manufactured, sold,
and maintained in Mexico. The allegedly defective tires were marked "made in Mexico."
The driver and seven passengers were Mexican citizens on a local trip in Mexico, while
working for a Mexican company. Id. at 731.
219. "Both sides exhaustively briefed the choice-of-law issue and the Plaintiffs strenu-
ously argued that the court should apply Texas law, but ultimately the court decided Mexi-
can law applied because Mexico was the forum with the most significant relationship to the
accident and the parties." Id. at 733.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 732.
223. The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994) provides that "[a] court of the
United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as
expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments."
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better known as the relitigation exception. 22 4
The Fifth Circuit applies a four-part test to determine the applicability
of the relitigation exception: First, the parties must be identical or in priv-
ity; second, the prior federal judgment must have been rendered by a
competent court; third, the prior federal action must have concluded in a
final judgment on the merits; and fourth, the suits must involve the same
claim or cause of action.225 These requirements might seem formidable
for a case dismissed several months earlier for retrial in Mexico, and for
an anti-suit injunction involving three other cases with somewhat differ-
ent parties. None of these issues were problems. Different lawsuits con-
cerning the same accident qualify for the "same parties" element, and it
"is no objection that the former action included parties not joined in the
present action, or vice versa, so long as [the test's other three elements
were met]." 226 The competent-court element was satisfied by the court's
diversity jurisdiction,227 but the court also noted it retained jurisdiction to
issue this injunction more than thirty days after dismissal. 228 Of course,
no other conclusion is possible because without that ongoing jurisdiction,
anti-suit injunctions under the relitigation exception would have little
meaning.
The court's analysis of the third element-a final judgment on the mer-
its-is less convincing. The court found that this element was satisfied by
Fifth Circuit precedent that a forum non conveniens dismissal that in-
cludes a choice of law determination is final and may be issued with
prejudice. 229 That takes care of finality, but fails to address the on-the-
merits prong, which would seemingly require a resolution of the plain-
tiffs' right to recover, but the court did not discuss it further. The relitiga-
tion exception's fourth element requires the same claim in both suits. In
spite of varying claims in the four suits, the court found them sufficiently
connected to satisfy the same claim requirement.2 30 While it is under-
standable that a federal court would want to prevent litigious parties from
circumventing its forum non conveniens dismissal by filing in nearby
courts, the court's analysis is not convincing on the Fifth Circuit's require-
ment of an on-the-merits adjudication of the prior lawsuit. Perhaps the
224. Vasquez, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 734 (quoting Woods Expl. and Prod. Co. v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971) "[The Anti-Injunction Act] assures the winner in
a federal court that he will not be deprived of the fruits of his victory by a later contrary
state judgment." Woods, 438 F.2d at 1312).
225. Vasquez, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 734 (citing Regions Bank of Louisiana v. Rivet, 224
F.3d 483, 488 (5th Cir. 2000) and other cases).
226. Id. at 735 (quoting Dreyfus v. First Nat. Bank, 424 F.2d 1171, 1175-76 (7th Cir.
1970)).
227. Jurisdiction over the original action was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), gov-
erning actions between citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign state. Id.
228. Id. (citing Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 546 F.2d 84, 90 (5th Cir.
1977); Carey v. Sub Sea Int'l, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1073 (E.D. Tex. 2000)).
229. Id. (citing Quintero v. Klaveness Ship Lines, 914 F.2d 717, 719 (5th Cir. 1990)).
The court added that plaintiffs acquiesced as to finality by appealing the forum non con-




solution is for the Fifth Circuit to reconsider that requirement in forum
non conveniens cases, since they will necessarily not be adjudicated on
the merits.
The court made two further points that bear mentioning here. First,
the Ant-Injunction Act applies only to injunctions against state court liti-
gation, leaving federal courts free to enjoin further litigation in other fed-
eral courts. 231 Second, the Anti-Injunction Act does not authorize the
appropriate injunctions, it merely outlines when they may be issued. In-
junctive authority comes from the All Writs Act.
232
Urena Taylor v. Daimler Chrysler Corp.2 3 3 is the second Firestone case,
also involving a single car accident in Nuevo Leon, Mexico. Decedent's
1994 Dodge truck crashed when the tire tread allegedly separated. His
survivors sued car maker Daimler Chrysler and tire maker Bridgestone/
Firestone in a Texas state court. Defendants removed to federal court
and moved for forum non conveniens dismissal, agreeing to submit to
jurisdiction in Mexico and pay any resulting damages.234 The court began
by noting that in diversity cases, the Fifth Circuit required the application
of federal law rather than state law to forum non conveniens issues.
235
Under the Fifth Circuit test, defendants must first demonstrate the availa-
bility of an adequate alternative forum, and then show that the balance of
public and private factors favors litigation in the other forum. 236 Given
defendants' agreement to submit to Mexico's jurisdiction and Mexico's
established record as an adequate forum for wrongful death cases, the
court quickly found the adequate-forum requirement satisfied.237 It had
no greater trouble with the private-public interest balancing test. All op-
erative events occurred in Mexico-the decedent was a Mexican citizen,
as were all plaintiffs; the accident occurred in Mexico where the car was
also maintained; all medical and law enforcement personnel were in Mex-
ico and their availability in Texas would be both expensive and difficult.
The Texas court had no compulsory process power over most of the wit-
nesses, all the pertinent reports were in Spanish, and if it were necessary
to view the site (admittedly rarely done), it would be far more difficult
from Texas.238 The public factors pointed in the same direction. The
231. Id. at 734.
232. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994), noted in Vasquez, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 733-34. See also
JAMES P. GEORGE, THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE DOOR at 56-60 (2000).
233. Taylor v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 196 F. Supp. 2d 428 (E.D. Tex. 2001).
234. Id. at 430-31.
235. Id. at 431 (citing In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., on July 9, 1982,
821 F.2d 1147,1159 (5th Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds and remanded, Pan American
World Airways, Inc. v. Lopez, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989), reinstated in relevant part, In re Air
Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 883 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1989)).
236. Id. at 431-32 (citing McLennan v. American Eurocopter Corp., Inc., 245 F.3d 403,
423 (5th Cir. 2001)); see supra note 197 for the list of private and public interest factors.
237. Id. at 432 (citing Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 806 F. Supp. 139, 143 (E.D. Tex. 1992));
David Rodriguez Diaz v. Mexicana de Avion, S.A., No. SA-86-CA-1065, 1987 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13399, at *4-9 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 1987), affid mere. 843 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. t988).
Mexico recognizes wrongful death actions but not strict liability; neither that nor the pros-
pect of lesser damages renders a forum inadequate. Id. (citing Rodriguez Diaz, at *8).
238. Id. at 433.
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court noted its large docket and Texas's lack of interest in the contro-
versy. If the case were litigated here, the Texas choice of law rules would
almost certainly indicate the application of Mexico's law, which this court
would be less skilled in applying.239 The court accordingly granted de-
fendants' motion and ordered dismissal, conditioned on (1) a court in
Nuevo Leon, Mexico, asserting jurisdiction; (2) with the defendants ap-
pearing generally and waiving any jurisdictional defenses and any limita-
tions defenses that did not exist at the time the Texas complaint was filed;
and (3) with defendants producing in Nuevo Leon all of plaintiffs' reason-
able discovery requests.2 40 Implicit in these conditions is the court's
power to reinstate for non-complying defendants.
In Psarros v. Avior Shipping, Inc.,241 a federal court denied a forum
non conveniens motion filed in a Greek seaman's injury claim arising in
the Port of Houston. Greek resident Nikolas Psarros was a third mate
aboard the MN Eirini, a Panamanian-registered ship owned by defend-
ants Makri Shipping Company and operated by Overseas Shipping Com-
pany, Ltd., both Panamanian corporations. While the Eirini was docking
in the Port of Houston on May 8, 2000, a securing rope snapped and
struck Psarros's leg, partially amputating it. The snapped line was sold
either by Defendant International Marine Supplies, Inc., (a Texas corpo-
ration) or by Universal Maritime Service Corporation (a New York
corporation) .242
Psarros sued his employers and the rope's sellers in federal district
court in Galveston, alleging claims under the Jones Act and state law.
2 4 3
Defendants opposed plaintiff's choice of forum on two grounds: a forum
selection clause designating Greece as the exclusive forum, 244 and a fo-
rum non conveniens objection. Because Psarros's response to the motion
conceded that Greek courts were both available and adequate for his
claims,245 the court went straight to the balancing of public and private
factors. Both favored retention of the case. Private interests pointed to
the Texas forum because proof was more available in Texas, the site of
the injury, of plaintiff's initial treatment and the accident reports.
246
239. Id. at 434 (citing Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984)).
240. Id. at 434-35.
241. Psarros v. Avior Shipping, Inc., 192 F .Supp. 2d 751 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
242. Id. at 752.
243. Id. The court expressed doubt regarding Psarros's allegations that Makri and
Avior were his employers, with defendants' allegations of his employment status with
Overseas appearing more plausible. But because this was defendants' motion to dismiss,
all disputed allegations were construed in plaintiff's favor. Id. at 752, n.1.
244. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
245. The court recited the requirements of federal forum non conveniens as a two-part
test: (1) available and adequate forum, and (2) the balancing of public and private inter-
ests. Psarros, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 755 (citing Piper, 454 U.S. at 254-56); see supra note 197.
Some courts have referred to this as a four part requirement. See supra note 198. Both are
correct, although the two-part test conveniently distinguishes the alternative forum and
balancing factors. In this case, Plaintiff expressly stated that he "does not contest that
Greece is [an] adequate and available [forum] as to the Defendants." Psarros, 192 F .Supp.
2d at 755.
246. Id. at 755-56.
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Moreover, the relevant information concerning the failed rope was also
located in the Untied States, though not necessarily in Texas.247 Wit-
nesses would be more available locally and, more importantly, defendants
had not shown that the various Texas witnesses would be subject to a
Greek court's subpoena or willing to testify there.248 None of the defend-
ants had assets in Greece, and the court expressed concern about the re-
sulting viability of plaintiff's remedy. 249 The court also observed that
although the defendants argue the inconvenience of the Texas forum,
they waited one year to file the motion, just six weeks before trial. Apart
from the inconvenience a forum non conveniens dismissal would work at
this point, the delay undermined defendants' inconvenience argument.
250
Public interest factors also pointed to retaining the case. The foreign de-
fendants had all availed themselves of the United States market and in
doing so, had allegedly engaged in unsafe procedures. The court con-
ceded that the case would be complicated by some degree of far-flung
evidence and parties, but that there had been no showing that trying the
case in Greece would ease this burden.251 The court thus denied the mo-
tion and retained the case, carefully noting that in doing so, it was not
deciding whether Greek or United States law governed.
252
3. Parallel Litigation
Parallel litigation is difficult to define. Sometimes it means identical
lawsuits with exactly the same parties bringing the same claims, and
sometimes it means two or more lawsuits that may result in claim preclu-
sion for some or all parties. Parallel litigation occurs both intra- and in-
ter-jurisdictionally, and involves remedies of transfer and consolidation
(intra-jurisdictional only), stay, dismissal, and anti-suit injunction, or in
many cases, allowing both cases to proceed and using the first-to-judg-
ment to preclude the other.253 This article only discusses parallel litiga-
tion involving at least one case outside of Texas, that is, it will not
consider multiple related actions involving courts all located in Texas.
254
247. Id. at 756.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 756, n.10.
251. Id. at 756-57.
252. Id. at 757, n.11.
253. See generally, Parallel Litigation, supra note 20; James P. George, International
Parallel Litigation-A Survey of Current Conventions and Model Laws, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J.
499 (2001).
254. The Survey period produced five in-state instances of parallel litigation, all involv-
ing conflicts between state and federal courts. See DVI Bus. Credit Corp. v. Crowder, 193
F. Supp. 2d 1002 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (federal court denied motion to stay federal case in favor
of four Texas state court cases, which themselves had been stayed by federal bankruptcy
filing); Lemery v. Ford Motor Co., 205 F. Supp. 2d 710 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (federal court
declines to remand personal injury action removed from probate court, finding an excep-
tion to the probate prohibition in federal courts); Jones v. Hoel, 211 F. Supp. 2d 823 (E.D.
Tex. 2002) (federal court rejected defendants' notice of stay, which they filed after the
Texas insurance commissioner declared that defendant physician's insurer was impaired);
Am. Nat'l Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 274 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2001) (notes in passing the removal
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The Fifth Circuit affirmed an unauthorized anti-suit injunction in the
Survey period's only reported instance of parallel litigation. Fleetwood
Enterprises, Inc. v. Gaskamp2 55 was a family's claim for personal injury
from formaldehyde exposure from a mobile home manufactured in Mis-
sissippi. The mobile home's financing agreement had an arbitration
clause designating Harris County, Texas, as the forum.256 After becom-
ing ill, the Gaskamp parents ignored the clause and sued in a Mississippi
state court.257 Defendants filed this action in federal court in Texas to
compel arbitration and stay (or enjoin) the Mississippi action. The fed-
eral district court ordered the Gaskamps to arbitrate and halted the Mis-
sissippi litigation.258 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the arbitration
clause, but ruled that it applied only to the parents since the Gaskamp
children were not parties to the financing agreement containing the
clause.259 Thus, the Mississippi action was "stayed" as to the parents but
allowed to continue on the children's claims. The case is fully discussed
in the choice of law section, 260 focusing on the choice of law considera-
tions in an action to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration
Act.
Although Fleetwood's outcome is reasonable, its misapplication of the
stay provision of the Federal Arbitration Act is a concern. The Act pro-
vides that when a court is satisfied that an action is subject to a written
arbitration agreement, it shall, under any party's application, stay the ac-
tion.261 In spite of the statute's language-"any of the courts of the
United States"-it applies to state as well as federal courts. 262 But, and
this is important, the statute's language expressly limits the staying power
to the court in which the action is pending. 263 This limitation is consistent
with the meaning of stay-best used to describe a court's decision to stop
a case on its own docket temporarily (stopping permanently is called a
dismissal). Apart from the Bankruptcy Act's misuse of stay,264 a court
does not stay litigation in another court; rather, it enjoins a party under
of a state court action for consolidation with parallel federal action) (note that this is not
really a declining of jurisdiction, but a manipulation of parallel cases); and Diamond Off-
shore Co. v. A&B Builders, Inc., 302 F.3d 531, 540 (5th Cir. 2002) (reversing a federal
district court's dismissal, finding the federal and state cases were not sufficiently parallel).
255. Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 2002).
256. Id. at 1073, n.4.
257. Id. at 1072.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1077-78.
260. See infra notes 333-44 and accompanying text.
261. The Act states: "If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the
United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for
such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue
involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement,
shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration
has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for
the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration." 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1999) (empha-
sis added).
262. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 27 n.34 (1983).
263. See emphasized language, supra note 261.
264. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1993).
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its jurisdiction from pursuing the other litigation. For the federal district
court's act of stopping the Mississippi lawsuit, the proper term is anti-suit
injunction, which is not only difficult to obtain in any case, but is subject
to special limits where federal courts are acting against state litigation.
Specifically, the Anti-Injunction Act bars federal courts from enjoining
state court litigation except in three instances: where the injunction is au-
thorized by act of Congress (this one is not); where the injunction is nec-
essary in aid of in rem jurisdiction (not the case here); and where the
injunction is necessary to protect or effectuate a final federal judgment
(no final judgment here).265 Clearly Fleetwood or a co-defendant needed
to ask the Mississippi court to stay its own action, which it was required to
do after the federal court ordered arbitration.
II. CHOICE OF LAW
Choosing the applicable substantive law is a question, like personal ju-
risdiction and judgment enforcement, involving both forum law and con-
stitutional issues. Understanding these issues requires a clear focus on
basic principles. First, choice of law is a question of state law, both in
state and federal courts.266 Second, it is a question of forum state law.
Renvoi-the practice of using another state's choice of law rule-is al-
most never employed unless the forum state directs it, and even then, the
forum state remains in control.267 Third, the forum state has broad power
to make choice of law decisions, either legislatively or judicially, subject
only to limited constitutional requirements. 268
Within the forum state's control of choice of law is a hierarchy of
choice of law rules. At the top are legislative choice of law rules, that is,
statutes directing the application of certain state's laws, based on events
or people important to the operation of that specific law. 269 Second, in
the choice of law hierarchy is party-controlled choice of law, that is,
choice of law clauses in contracts that apply unless public policy dictates
265. The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994) provides that "[a] court of the
United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as
expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments."
266. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941).
267. The Restatement (Second) creates a presumption against renvoi except for limited
circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8 (1971). Although
commentators defend renvoi's limited use, they acknowledge its general lack of acceptance
in the United States except in limited circumstances, usually found in statutes directing the
use of renvoi. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 20, at 67-72 (especially 68 n.4); WEINTRAUB,
supra note 1 at 88-94. Texas law provides for renvoi in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 1.105(b), 2.402(b), 4.102(b), 8.106, 9.103 (Vernon 1994 & 2002). For federal courts,
Klaxon reiterates the forum state's control of choice of law. 313 U.S. at 497.
268. See infra notes 381-82 and accompanying text for a brief description of these con-
stitutional requirements.
269. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1) and cmt. a (1971). See e.g.,
Owens Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1999) (applying an earlier version of the
Texas wrongful death statute, requiring that the court apply the rules of substantive law
that are appropriate to the case.); TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon
1997 & Supp. 2003).
1318 [Vol. 56
CONFLICT OF LAWS
otherwise. 270 Third in the hierarchy is the common law, now controlled
in Texas by the most significant relationship test of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws.271 This Survey article is organized according to
this hierarchy, that is, statutory choice of law, followed by choice of law
clauses, and concluding with choice of law under the most significant rela-
tionship test. Special issues such as constitutional limitations are dis-
cussed in the following section. This grouping results in a discussion that
mixes Texas Supreme Court opinions with those of Texas intermediate
appellate courts, federal district courts, and the Fifth Circuit. In spite of
this mix, readers should of course note that, because choice of law is a
state law issue, the only binding opinions are those of the Texas Supreme
Court.
272
A. STATUTORY CHOICE OF LAW RULES
The Survey period offered only one short discussion involving Texas
choice of law statutes. Mayo v. Hartford Life Insurance Co.,27 3 deals with
the validity in Texas of corporations buying life insurance policies on em-
ployees in the absence of an insurable interest-a practice illegal in Texas
but allowed in some states.274 Mayo's statutory issue was article 21.42 of
the Texas Insurance Code, stating that insurance contracts payable to
Texas citizens or inhabitants by any entity doing business in Texas is a
Texas contract, governed by Texas law.27 5 Because the beneficiaries were
employers outside of Texas, they did not fall within the statute's express
language, thus leaving the choice of law analysis to the most significant
relationship test.276 But, the defendant corporations also argued that ar-
ticle 21.42 defined the outer reaches of Texas insurance law-that is,
Texas insurance law governs everything within 21.42 and nothing outside
of it. The court rejected this argument, finding nothing within the statute
270. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187. Law Of The State Chosen
By The Parties § 187 (1971) allows contracting parties to choose a governing law, within
defined limits as explained infra note 285. Texas has adopted § 187. See DeSantis v. Wack-
enhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677-78 (Tex. 1990).
271. See infra note 307 for the factors in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 6 (1971).
272. The exception would be where a federal court rules on a constitutional issue such
as that discussed in Nat'l W. Life Ins. Co. v. Rowe, 86 S.W.3d 285 (Tex. App.-Austin
2002, pet. filed), discussed infra at notes 345-55.
273. Mayo v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 220 F. Supp. 2d 714 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
274. See id. The Texas insurable interest doctrine restricts ownership of life insurance
policies on Texas residents to "putative beneficiaries," defined as someone (1) "so closely
related by blood or affinity that he wants the other to continue to live, irrespective of the
monetary considerations; (2) a creditor; [or] (3) one possessing a reasonable expectation of
pecuniary benefit or advantage from the [insured's continued life]." Id. at 727 (citing vari-
ous cases) (first alteration in original). Texas law also permits a person to designate his or
her beneficiary, even absent an insurable interest (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.49-1,
§§ 1, 2, 3, & 5 (Vernon 1981)), and allows employers to insure key employees. Id.
275. The statute reads: "Any contract of insurance payable to any citizen or inhabitant
of this State by any insurance company or corporation doing business within this State shall
be held to be a contract made and entered into under and by virtue of the laws of this State
relating to insurance." TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (Vernon 1981).
276. Mayo, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 738-39.
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or its purpose to support it. Instead, the court found that 21.42 was in-
tended to impose Texas law on insurance policies naming Texans as ben-
eficiaries, but without repealing "the longstanding, prophylactic common
law insurable interest doctrine. '277 This left the analysis to the most sig-
nificant relationship test, as discussed below. 278
In Gilcrease v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp.,279 the San Antonio Court of
Appeals addressed a question of first impression regarding Texas's new
wrongful-death borrowing statute. Specifically, the court considered
whether Alaska's statute of repose applied in a Texas action for an asbes-
tos-related death. This case is fully discussed in the Limitations
section.280
B. CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS
Texas law permits contracting parties to choose a governing law, sub-
ject to the exceptions discussed in Monsanto Co. v. Boustany,281 an action
by 110 former Monsanto employees suing for the right to exercise stock
options. Plaintiffs had worked for Monsanto-subsidiary Fisher Controls
International, Inc., and wished to act on earlier incentive plans that had
been granted each year from 1989 through 1992. All options included
Fisher employees, and expressly expired three years from the date of cre-
ation or upon termination of employment, whichever occurred first. Mon-
santo sold Fisher in 1992, deeming the sale a termination of employment,
triggering a clause in the options that required exercise, if at all, within
three months of termination. At that time, Monsanto's stock was lower
than the price at which the 1990 and 1991 options could be exercised,
which meant that the plaintiffs could not profitably exercise those options
within the three month window. Monsanto then decided to extend the
options for nine months. None of the plaintiffs protested this decision
and some exercised the option when Monsanto's stock price rose. 282
By 1996, Monsanto's stock price had risen considerably and a number
of Fisher employees then attempted to exercise their earlier options.
Monsanto refused, and when the Fisher employees sued in a Texas state
court, Monsanto moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the
Fisher sale was a termination of employment under Delaware law and
that the action was barred by Delaware's three year limitation period.283
The trial court granted summary judgment without stating its grounds;
the court of appeals reversed, finding that no termination had occurred
277. Id. at 738.
278. See infra notes 384-90 and accompanying text.
279. Gilcrease v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 70 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2001, pet. denied) (discussing TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon Supp.
2003)).
280. See infra notes 416-24 and accompany text.
281. Monsanto Co. v. Boustany, 73 S.W.3d 225 (Tex. 2002).




and that Texas's four year limitation period applied. 284
The Texas Supreme Court reversed again. For governing law, the su-
preme court honored the option clause's designation of Delaware law,
noting that Texas law approves of choice of law clauses "if the particular
issue is one that they could have resolved by explicit agreement. '285 The
supreme court further noted that the chosen law must have a reasonable
relationship to the contract and must not "thwart or offend the public
policy of the state the law of which ought otherwise to apply. '286 The
court then observed that it knew of no public policy in Texas that would
be thwarted by allowing parties to agree to these terms and specifically
noted that Delaware law should govern a stock option from a Delaware
corporation.
287
Plaintiffs lost their breach of contract claims, but Monsanto failed on
the second choice of law issue-that Delaware's three year limitation pe-
riod would bar plaintiffs' remaining claims for fraud and conversion.
Monsanto urged the supreme court to adopt Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws section 142 governing the application of foreign limita-
tions periods.288 But Monsanto's appellate brief failed to argue the sub-
stance or effect of Delaware limitation period, and accordingly the
supreme court declined to consider it and remanded the fraud and con-
version claims.
289
The Texas Supreme Court also held, in 2002, that a contract's choice of
Colorado law would not be upset by the contract's reference to a uniform
act adopted in similar form in Texas. In re J.D. Edwards World Solutions
Co.290 was an action for various contract and commercial tort claims, op-
posed by a motion to compel arbitration as provided in the parties' con-
tract. In 1997, Arlington-based Doskocil Manufacturing Company
licensed software from J.D. Edwards World Solutions from Colorado.
The software failed, and in 1998 Doskocil requested arbitration pursuant
284. Id.
285. Id. at 229 (citing DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 677-78, in turn citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971)). The Texas Supreme Court has adopted RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187's provision that (1) parties may choose
any state's law to govern any issue which the parties could have explicitly agreed to in the
contract, and (2) for issues not capable of explicit agreement, the parties may choose any
law bearing a substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction, unless it would
violate a fundamental policy of a state having a materially greater interest than the chosen
state, and which would be the state selected under the contract choice of law principles in
§ 188; Id. see infra note 316 for § 188's factors; see also DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 677-81.
286. Id. at 229 (citing DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 677).
287. Id. at 229.
288. Id. Readers should note that the ALI has amended § 142 twice since the Restate-
ment's original publication. The most recent version appears in the 1988 supplement to the
1986 Revisions, and provides that § 6 governs limitations issues, and that in general: (1) a
forum limitation period barring the claim will be applied unless exceptional circumstances
make such a result unreasonable; and (2) a forum limitation permitting a claim will be
applied unless the forum has no significant interest and the claim would be barred under
the limitation period of a state with a more significant relationship to the parties and the
occurrence.
289. Monsanto Co., 73 S.W.3d at 229, 233.
290. In re J.D. Edwards World Solutions Co., 87 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. 2002).
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to a clause in the licensing agreement designating Colorado law for the
dispute and the Uniform Arbitration Act for the arbitration procedure.
29'
The arbitration request listed claims for fraud, fraudulent inducement,
misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of warranty, and negli-
gence.292 Doskocil then asserted the same claims in a Texas state district
court. J.D. Edwards moved to compel arbitration of all claims, and the
trial court granted the motion except for the fraudulent inducement
claim.2 93 The court of appeals denied J.D. Edwards's mandamus request
on the remaining fraudulent inducement claim, leading to the same re-
quest in the Texas Supreme Court.294 The essential issue-whether the
arbitration clause covered the fraudulent inducement claim-rested on
what law governed, according to Doskocil. Its argument was that the al-
leged fraud occurred prior to the agreement and therefore could not be a
dispute "involving this Agreement" as the clause provided. Colorado law
would nonetheless include pre-agreement conduct,2 95 but Texas law ap-
parently did not address this, at least under the language of this arbitra-
tion clause.296 Doskocil thus hoped to avoid the Colorado precedent and
create an opposite result for Texas law.
The Texas Supreme Court quickly found that there was no basis for the
application of Texas law to this case. The court noted the power of con-
tracting parties under the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to
choose a governing law for issues capable of resolution by an explicit pro-
vision in the contract,2 97 and even for issues incapable of express agree-
ment so long as the chosen state has a substantial relationship to the
parties or the underlying transaction. 298 The court found that Colorado
indeed had a substantial relationship to the parties and the transaction, so
that under either section 187(1) or 187(2), the parties' choice of Colorado
law controlled.2
99
Doskocil argued that in spite of the Colorado choice of law, Texas law
governed because the arbitration clause referred to the Uniform Arbitra-
291. The clause read: "All disputes involving this Agreement, except actions arising
under the copyright provision of Title 17 of the U.S. Code, shall be determined under the
law of the State of Colorado and shall be submitted to an arbitrator appointed and operat-
ing under the Uniform Arbitration Act and the procedural rules of the American Arbitra-
tion Association. The location of the arbitration hearing will be chosen by the party not
initiating the arbitration or action. The written decision of the arbitrator shall be final,
binding and convertible to a court judgment in any appropriate jurisdiction." Id. at 548.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 548-49.
295. Id. at 550-51 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395
(1967) (interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4); National Camera, Inc. v.
Love, 644 P.2d 94 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (adopting Prima for Colorado's Arbitration Act);
Austin v. U.S. West, Inc., 926 P.2d 181 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (applying this rule to an even
more narrowly-worded arbitration clause)).
296. The opinion does not refer to contrary Texas law.
297. Id. at 549 (citing DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 677-78, in turn quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICI' OF LAWS, § 187(1) (1971)).
298. Id. (citing DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 678, in turn quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)




tion Act, on which the Texas Arbitration Act was based, and that Texas
law was necessarily implicated when Doskocil filed its lawsuit in Texas.
That is, because the parties' arbitration clause referred to the Uniform
Arbitration Act, and because the Texas Arbitration Act was drawn from
the Uniform Act, Texas law necessarily applied when a resulting lawsuit
was brought in a Texas court. The supreme court rejected this, finding
instead that an arbitration clause's designation of Colorado law would
not be disturbed merely because a party filed suit in Texas. 30 0 But, a
question remained about which law did apply-Colorado's law, federal
law, or the Uniform Arbitration Act-even though the result was the
same under all three. 30 1 As noted above, both the United States Su-
preme Court and Colorado appellate courts had held that parties could
not avoid arbitration clauses with the claim that the underlying contract
was fraudulently induced. 30 2 Doskocil did not argue contrary Texas pre-
cedent, but apparently hoped to avoid the Colorado precedent and set a
different one in Texas.
Doskocil's next argument entered rare territory for conflict of laws:
non-forum law as affecting the forum's appellate remedies. The issue was
whether the extraordinary remedy of mandamus was available to J.D.
Edwards; it would not be available if interlocutory appeal was possible.
Under the Texas Arbitration Act, interlocutory appeals are available for
denials of motions to compel arbitrations generally,30 3 but are not availa-
ble for denials relating to arbitrations under the Federal Arbitration
Act. 30 4 Doskocil argued that this was simply a TAA appeal (contrary to
J.D. Edwards's express reliance on the Federal Arbitration Act in its orig-
inal motion to compel), 30 5 and thus entitled to interlocutory appeal but
not mandamus. This argument was based on Doskocil's earlier point that
the arbitration clause's reliance on the Uniform Arbitration Act necessa-
rily invoked the Texas Arbitration Act. The court again rejected this,
resulting in the interesting feature of the application of non-Texas law as
affecting the Texas remedy.
Another important issue is noted briefly in Holley v. Grigg, discussed
below,30 6 where the court of appeals found a false conflict between Texas
and Missouri law in a dispute over the inheritance of an Edward Jones
investment account. The account had a choice of law clause designating
Missouri law. In finding the clause enforceable (though irrelevant be-
cause of its lack of conflict with Texas law), the court cited section
1.105(a) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code governing contracts
made under the Uniform Commercial Code, as this one was. The point
300. Id. at 549-50.
301. Id. at 550.
302. See supra note 294.
303. Id. at 551 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.098(a)(1) (Vernon
1997)).
304. 9 U.S.C. § 16 (1999).
305. In re J.D. Edwards, 87 S.W.3d at 548 (referring to J.D. Edwards's motion to com-
pel under article nine of the United States Code).
306. 65 S.W.3d 289 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, no pet.); see infra 401-04.
2003] 1323
SMU LAW REVIEW
for attorneys facing the enforcement of choice of law clauses is to deter-
mine which of several Texas statutes governs their validity and enforce-
ment.30 7 Invoking the wrong statute can mean a more difficult standard,
or worse, an inadequate foundation to sustain that choice on appeal.
C. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP TEST
If there is no statutory choice of law rule, and if contracting parties
have not made an effective choice of law, then Texas courts apply the
most significant relationship test from the Restatement (Second) of Con-
flict of Laws.308 The Survey period produced six noteworthy cases apply-
ing the test.
Mayo v. Hartford Life Insurance Co.3 9-an uncertified plaintiff and
defendant class action-concerns the validity in Texas of corporate-
owned life insurance policies ("COLI") on employees. Plaintiffs were a
group of Texas-based employees who sued various defendants seeking a
declaratory judgment that corporate-owned life insurance policies on em-
ployees were invalid. Plaintiffs named three employer defendants, two
307. TEX. Bus & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105 (Vernon Supp. 2003) applies to contracts
governed by the Texas version of the Uniform Commercial Code, and provides that parties
to UCC-based contracts bearing a reasonable relation to Texas and another state or nation
may agree to be governed by Texas or the other state's or nation's law, except for the
specific limits stated in § 1.105(b). Section 1.105(c) further imposes the requirements of
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51 (Vernon 2002) to appropriate UCC-based con-
tracts. Section 35.51 governs contracts involving at least $1 million in consideration or loan
value, and sets forth detailed rules regarding contracting parties choice of governing law,
such as (1) the requirement of the chosen law's having a reasonable relation to a party, the
subject matter, negotiations, or performance; (2) default provisions when the contract vio-
lates the chosen state's public policy; and (3) issues ineligible for party choice. TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 35.52 (Vernon 2002) makes voidable the choice of law clauses in
certain contracts for real property construction in Texas. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 35.53 (Vernon 2002) applies to contracts for the sale, lease, or other disposition of goods
for consideration of $50,000 or less, that are not governed by § 1.105, and for which execu-
tion occurred at least partly in Texas and involved either a Texas resident or a corporation
or association created under Texas law; it requires that choice of law or choice of forum
clauses in such contracts designating another state "be set out conspicuously in print, type,
or other forum of writing that is bold-faced, capitalized, underlined, or otherwise set out in
such a matter that a reasonable person against whom the provision may operate would
notice." Id. § 35.53(b). Failure to comply makes the clause voidable. Id.; TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 35.531 (Vernon 2002) applies to internet contracts and imposes Texas
law unless a party proves that the other party had notice of a choice of law clause and
agreed to it. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.42 (Vernon 1981) imposes Texas law on insurance
contracts made payable to a Texas citizen or inhabitant.; for a case involving § 21.42, see
infra notes 309-24.
308. The embodiment of the most significant relationship test are seven factors to be
balanced according to the needs of the particular case. They are: (a) the needs of the
interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant
policies of other interested states, and the relative interests of those states in the determi-
nation of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic
policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of
result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971). This listing is not by priority,
which varies from case to case. Id. at cmt. c. In a larger sense, the most significant rela-
tionship test includes the other choice of law sections throughout the Restatement. Id.
309. Mayo v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 220 F. Supp. 2d 714 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
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insurers, and others, seeking certification of a class of employers and in-
surers who engage in the practice of selling insurance policies to corpora-
tions to insure the lives of their employees. The employers would pay the
insurance premiums by borrowing money from the insurers, and would
claim the interest paid on these loans as tax deductions. The employers
also earned non-taxable interest through the COLI policies. When the
employee died, the employer would use the death benefit to repay the
premium loans and cover other expenses. 310
Texas law clearly forbids COLI policies.311 Defendants argued that
Georgia law governed and would allow the policies, and that alterna-
tively, the laws of Arkansas, North Carolina, or Delaware would apply,
presumably reaching the same result as Georgia law.31 2 This was a fed-
eral diversity case and the federal court accordingly applied Texas conflict
of laws principles.313 Starting with the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws section 6, the court immediately noted its predicate requirement
that the court follow any statutory directives of the forum state-that is,
choice of law statutes preempt the most significant relationship test.31 4
As discussed above, the only possibly pertinent statute is article 21.42 of
the Texas Insurance Code, which mandates Texas law for policies payable
in Texas, but not to out-of-state beneficiaries as in this case. 315
Absent a controlling choice of law statute, the insurance contracts at
issue were analyzed under the Restatement (Second)'s general choice of
law test and its contract principles. 316 In undertaking this analysis, the
court noted the lack of precedents for applying contract choice of law
issues to claims limited to the insurable interest doctrine.317 The resulting
310. Id. at 722 and nn.14, 15. The Internal Revenue Service disputed some of these
deductions and other tax issues, although the opinion does not report the resolution of
those disputes. Id. at n.15.
311. Id. at 727. A putative insurance beneficiary only has an insurable interest in the
life of another where the beneficiary is "(1) so closely related by blood or affinity that he
wants the other to continue to live, irrespective of the monetary considerations; (2) a credi-
tor; [or] (3) one possessing a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit or advantage
from the continued life of another." Id. (citing various cases) (alteration in original).
312. Id. at 728.
313. Id. (citing Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Denman
by Denman v. Snapper Div., 131 F.3d 546, 548 (5th Cir. 1998)).
314. Mayo, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 728 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 6(1) (1971) and various cases).
315. Id. at 728, discussed supra at note 275 and accompanying text.
316. The general choice of law test is the seven-factor balancing test commonly known
as the most significant relationship test, see supra note 308, although that name may also be
used for the Restatement's collection of choice of law principles. The contract choice of
law principles are found at RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 186-221
(1971). In particular, section 188 states the primary test for contract cases (in the absence
of an effective choice of law clause), starting with the factors in section 6, followed by
special attention to five additional factors: "(a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of
negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of performance, (d) the location of the subject
matter of the contract, and (e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation,
and place of business of the parties." RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS at
§ 188(2) (1971).
317. Mayo, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 730 n.36 (referring to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 196 (1971), which applies to contracts for the rendition of services, and
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analysis in this first-impression case is as thorough as any this Survey's
authors have seen, and is somewhat too long to report here. The difficult
issues included (1) contacts with eight states, 318 (2) the various states'
policies regarding insurable interests, 319 (3) the constitutional limits on
the extraterritorial application of Texas or Georgia law,320 (4) the parties'
justified expectations in making multi-state contracts, 32' (5) the different
defendant-insurers which triggered different applications of section 188,
and (6) the result of no one state clearly having the most significant rela-
tionship to this case. 322 The court concluded that although no one state
emerged as dominant, the Texas forum's substantial interest and contacts
dictated the application of its law.
32 3
If Judge Atlas provided a model choice of law analysis in Mayo, the
Fifth Circuit did less in two abbreviated opinions, one possibly setting bad
precedent. 32 4 Schneider National Transport v. Ford Motor Co.,325 was a
claim against insurers to recover costs in defending actions arising from a
multi-vehicle collision. Schneider is the successor entity to Builders
Transport, Inc., a national freight company based in South Carolina (its
state of incorporation is not given). In 1993, one of Builders's trucks was
involved in an accident in Texas which led to two deaths and several cata-
strophic injuries. The resulting lawsuit in Jefferson County, Texas, was
settled before trial. The insurers paid portions of the settlement, but
Builders/Schneider claimed reimbursement for defense costs, leading to
this lawsuit. The dispute concerned the pro-rata expense reimbursement
between primary insurer, Planet Insurance Company, and the excess-cov-
erage insurer, Alexander and Alexander of New York, Inc. The trial
court found that Pennsylvania law governed based on Alexander's incor-
poration there, and that under Pennsylvania law, plaintiff Schneider was
entitled to summary judgment against both insurers.
gives priority to the state where the services are to be performed, unless the parties have
made an effective choice of law, or unless some other state has a more significant relation-
ship to the dispute, under the factors listed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 6(2) (1971), see supra note 308).
318. Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, New York, North Carolina, Penn-
sylvania and Texas all had some connection to the case, although the Texas and Georgia
connections were strongest. See id. at 722, 739-41.
319. Insurable interest doctrine is explained supra note 274. In discussing Texas policy
regarding insurable interest, the court noted another Survey-period case, then valid but
now withdrawn. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Smith, 77 S.W.3d 859
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002), vacated, 2002 WL 31235437 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] Oct. 3, 2002), withdrawn, 93 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec.
5, 2002). In a prescient aside, the Mayo court found Smith unpersuasive as signaling a
change in Texas law on insurable interest. Mayo, 220 F. Supp. at 734.
320. id. at 739-41.
321. Id. at 742-43.
322. Id. at 758.
323. Id. at 763.
324. Federal opinions on state choice of law rules are, of course, no more precedential
than any other federal ruling on state law. Nonetheless, these decisions are often applied
with the same force and should be carefully decided.
325. Schneider Nat'l Transp. v. Ford Motor Co., 280 F.3d 532 (5th Cir. 2002).
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The Fifth Circuit reversed on both choice of law and the merits. After
first noting a false conflict between Texas and Pennsylvania law (both
endorsed the plain meaning rule applied in the summary judgment), 326
the court went on to find that if there was a conflict, Texas law controlled.
In particular, the court found that the only relation that Pennsylvania had
to this case was the excess coverage insurer's incorporation there, even
though that insurer did its business from New York. On the other hand,
all litigation leading to this dispute occurred in Texas and involved Texas
attorneys.327 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted the applicability
of the most significant relationship test but failed to cite its substance. 328
If it had, included would be not only the most significant relationship test
in section 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, but also
section 188 (the general test for contracts) and possibly section 193 (gov-
erning casualty insurance policies). 329 The conclusion that Pennsylvania
law does not apply is almost certainly correct. If sections 188 and 193
were applied, their reference to the situs of negotiation and the "principal
location of the insured risk" 330 would have lead to South Carolina or New
York, and not Pennsylvania. 331 Neither would it have led to Texas, a for-
tuitous accident site. Given the nationwide coverage of this policy, the
notion of adjudicating the contact's meaning under the law of any state
where an accident occurred does not lead to the certainty, uniformity,
and predictability of result called for in section 6.332 On the other hand, if
plaintiff's only choice of law request was for Pennsylvania law, the court's
application of Texas law is correct by default. 333 But, courts have a sua
326. Id. at 536.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. See supra notes 308 (§ 6's factors) & 315 (§ 188's factors). RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 193 governs "Contracts of Fire, Surety or Casualty Insur-
ance" and calls for the application of the state "which the parties understood was to be the
principle location of the insured risk during the term of the policy," unless some other state
has a more significant relationship. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 193
(1971).
330. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 193, quoted supra note 329.
331. See supra note 316 for RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 188's factors.
332. "[Cjertainty, predictability and uniformity of result" make up the sixth factor of
the seven-factor most significant relationship test. See supra note 308; see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. i.
333. There is no federal precedent for this proposition because codified federal law
does not address the pleading and proof of state law. See infra note 434. In federal courts,
proof of state law is controlled by federal common law, simply requiring federal courts to
take judicial notice of states laws. Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S. 218, 223 (1885); Kucel v.
Walter E. Heller & Co., 813 F.2d 67, 74 (5th Cir. 1987). There is no clear allocation of a
burden or description of the necessary proof. Nonetheless, the point is almost certainly
valid either by analogy, or because state law controls in the absence of federal law. Texas
courts impose a burden on parties seeking the application of sister state or foreign law, see
TEX. R. EVID. 202, 203; see also Gevison v. Manhattan Const. Co. of Okla., 449 S.W.2d 458,
465 n.2 (Tex. 1969) (absent adequate proof of New York law, it is presumed that Texas law
is identical); accord, Pittsburgh Corning Corp. v. Walters, 1 S.W.3d 759 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied). Similarly, parties in federal court seeking the applica-
tion of a foreign country law must plead and prove its contents. FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1; see
also DP Aviation v. Smiths Indus. Aerospace & Defense Sys. Ltd., 268 F.3d 829 (9th Cir.
2001) (Washington state law applied in the absence of adequate proof of English law).
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sponte power to raise important issues, and this case warranted it. Al-
though the finding of a false conflict between Pennsylvania and Texas law
reduces the choice of Texas law to dictum, to the extent Schneider stands
as a choice of law analysis for nationwide insurance coverage, it is poorly
reasoned.
The Fifth Circuit repeated its Schneider-like non-analysis in a choice of
law footnote in Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., v. Gaskamp,334 a case none-
theless valuable for its discussion of the state choice of law function in
arbitrations compelled under the Federal Arbitration Act. 335 The case
involved a Texas family's claims for personal injury from formaldehyde
exposure. In 1997, the Gaskamps bought a mobile home manufactured
by Fleetwood Enterprises, and in doing so, signed a financing agreement
containing an arbitration clause applying to:
any and all controversies or claims arising out of, or in any way relat-
ing to, the Retail Installment Contract or Cash Sale Contract or the
negotiation, purchase, financing, installation, ownership, occupancy,
habitation, manufacture, warranties (express or implied), repair or
sale/disposition of the home which is the subject of the Retail Install-
ment Contract or Cash Sale Contract, whether those claims arise
from or concern contract, warranty, statutory, property or common
law.
3 3 6
After moving in, the Gaskamp family members began suffering from
throat and eye irritation and respiratory problems. In 1999, their daugh-
ter Brooke was hospitalized with breathing difficulties which were diag-
nosed as formaldehyde related. The Texas Department of Health tested
the home and found elevated levels of formaldehyde, and the Gaskamps
moved out.3
37
In June, 2000, the Gaskamp parents brought tort-related claims for
themselves and their three children against the seller, the financing insti-
tution, Fleetwood, and Georgia-Pacific Corporation (the particle board
manufacturer). 338 They chose a Mississippi state court as the forum, ap-
parently based on Fleetwood's location, and perhaps hoping to avoid the
arbitration clause which identified Harris County, Texas, as the forum. 3
39
Six months later, Fleetwood and Georgia-Pacific brought this action in
federal court in Houston to compel enforcement of the financing agree-
ment's arbitration clause. The federal district court ordered all the Mis-
sissippi claims arbitrated,340 and the Gaskamps appealed two points: that
the arbitration clause (1) could not apply to the Gaskamp's children's
claims, and (2) was unconscionable as to the Gaskamp parents' claims.341
334. Fleetwood Enter. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 2002).
335. Article 9 of the United States Code.
336. Fleetwood, 280 F.3d at 1071 n.2.
337. Id. at 1071-72.
338. Id. at 1072, n.3.
339. Id. at 1073 n.4.
340. Id. at 1072-73.
341. Id. at 1073.
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The Fifth Circuit reversed the arbitration order for the children's claims
but upheld it as to the parents.342 In finding the arbitration clause accept-
able for the parents' claims, the court noted that Texas law governed the
issues not addressed by the Federal Arbitration Act (under which this
claim was brought), and that Texas choice of law rules pointed to Texas
law.343 As with its decision in Schneider,344 the Fifth Circuit again con-
ducted a Texas choice of law analysis without resort to the elements listed
in section 6's most significant relationship test. Unlike Schneider, the re-
sult is not questionable. The Gaskamps purchased the mobile home in
Texas, signed the agreements in Texas, and the arbitration clause identi-
fied Harris County, Texas, as the proper forum. 345 Moreover, the parties
had not disputed the applicability of Texas law. Readers should note that
the Fleetwood analysis is one of contract only, since the federal action in
Texas concerned only the parties' agreement to arbitrate, and not the un-
derlying claims for personal injury.
National Western Life Insurance Co. v. Rowe,346 is an interlocutory ap-
peal of a class action certification. The underlying lawsuits for breach of
contract and fraud concerned National's alleged failure to refund premi-
ums for its child-rider coverage, applicable to premiums mistakenly paid
after the coverage had ceased at the child's twenty-fifth birthday. Na-
tional argued that the controlling law was that of the state of each class
member, both under the Restatement rules and the United States Su-
preme Court's opinion in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.347 The court of
appeals rejected this, finding that (1) Texas law applied under the Re-
statement's principles, and (2) that the parties had misread the facts in
Shutts. In its analysis, the court pointed out the distinction between the
forum state's choice of law rules and the constitutional limits on those
rules.
The court first decided that Texas law applied under sections 6,348 145
(the general tort principle) 349 and 188 (the general contract principle) of
342. Id. at 1078.
343. Id. at 1073, n.4. Implicit in the court's conclusion on this point is that the Erie
doctrine requires (1) that federal courts apply state law where federal law is silent, (2) that
the state law in question is that of the state in which the federal court sits, and (3) that the
starting point with the forum state's law is its choice of law rule. See Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Den-
man v. Snapper Div., 131 F.3d 546, 548-49 (5th Cir. 1998); see also CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 387-392 (6th ed. 2002).
344. See supra notes 325-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of Schneider.
345. Schneider, 280 F.3d at 1073, n.4.
346. Nat'l W. Life Ins. Co. v. Rowe, 86 S.W.3d 285 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.)
347. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
348. See supra note 308 for the factors in the most significant relationship test.
349. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2) (1971) is the General
Tort Principle, listing four contacts to be considered along with the factors in section 6.
They include: (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct
causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, be-
tween the parties is centered.
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the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Law. 350 National was domiciled
in Colorado but had no offices or employees there, and instead had its
principal place of business in Austin, Texas, where it maintains all contact
with policyholders, transmits correspondence containing the billing no-
tices, and receives premiums. 35 ' All child riders at issue were designed
in Texas, and all conduct allegedly causing injury occurred as a result of
National's activities in Texas. While only twenty-seven percent of the rid-
ers were sold in Texas, all class members maintained contact with Texas.
The court of appeals thus affirmed the trial court's application of Texas
law.
352
Defendant National argued that section 192 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) compelled application of the law of the residence of each class mem-
ber.353 Section 192 relates to insurance contracts, and provides that in the
absence of a valid choice of law agreement, the validity of life insurance
contracts is governed by the law of the state of the insured's domicile,
unless some other state has a more significant relationship to the transac-
tion and the parties. The court noted that National had apparently read
only the first clause of section 192 and failed to read the second, which
gave priority to the state with the more significant relationship, which the
court had already determined was Texas.354 The court then reiterated its
conclusion that Texas had the most significant relationship, noting the ad-
ditional factor in section 6 calling for choices of law promoting certainty,
predictability, and uniformity. That encouraged the application of one
law over many in class actions involving one defendant and a class cover-
ing forty-one states. 355
National's third challenge to the choice of Texas law was constitutional.
Specifically, National argued that the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts356 required the respective laws
of the states of each class member be applied unless Texas has sufficient
contacts with each class member. The court rejected this as well, finding
that Shutts rejected Kansas law because it had no connection to most of
the plaintiff class's claims, while Texas had some connection to each
plaintiff class member.357
Vega v. State 358 is an example of criminal law-ordinarily strictly fo-
rum law-encountering a conflict with another state's evidentiary privi-
lege rule. In Vega, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals invoked the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws in its analysis of the admissibil-
350. See supra note 316 (quoting factors from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 188 (1971)).





356. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
357. Id. at 301-02. For a further discussion of the constitutional limits on choice of law,
see infra notes 382-95 and accompanying text.
358. Vega v. State, 84 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
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ity in a Texas murder trial of defendant's confession obtained by Chicago
police while in custody there. In December 1994, Marie Garcia Vega and
her boyfriend fled to Chicago after their implication in a capital murder
committed in Starr County, Texas. Upon their apprehension, Chicago
police obtained a statement from Vega later used in her Texas murder
trial. In appealing her conviction, Vega challenged the Chicago confes-
sion's admissibility. 359
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed, 360 leaving the Court of
Criminal Appeals to ponder the admissibility of a juvenile confession le-
gally obtained in Illinois law, but privileged and inadmissible under Texas
law, where the offense and the trial occurred. A specious precedent ex-
isted in the Court of Criminal Appeals's recent decision in Davidson v.
State.361 There, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that admissibility of
out-of-state confessions is a procedural question and thus governed by
forum law; this resulted in the non-admissibility of a Montana confession
for which no recording was made, as required by Texas law.362 But Da-
vidson involved an adult defendant's confession, governed by Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure article 38.22 section 3(a). Texas law governing
juveniles' confessions is not only a different statute, it is codified at Texas
Family Code section 51.01.363 Unlike article 38.22, the Family Code re-
quires a magistrate's presence at the confession. Thus, Davidson's hold-
ing, that article 38.22 governed out-of-state confessions, had no direct
application to Vega's confession in Chicago.
To resolve this, the court's majority applied Texas conflict of laws prin-
ciples under Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws sections 6 and
145, with references to sections 138 and 139. But this lead only to a par-
tial conclusions that Texas law probably applied. Vega was a Texas resi-
dent charged with an offense in Texas, and her contact with Illinois was
limited to the one session of questioning in which this highly material
statement resulted.364 Although her statement was made in Illinois, that
state had no interest in the prosecution. 365 But while these factors point
to Texas law, the question of fairness remained. One such issue was the
lack of deterrent effect that would result from excluding this evidence.
Because the Illinois interrogation had complied with Illinois law, exclud-
ing Vega's confession here would have no effect either on Texas police or
Illinois police.366 As a result, the court remanded the case to the court of
359. Id. at 615.
360. Vega v. State, 32 S.W.3d 897 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000), rev'd and re-
manded, 84 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
361. Davidson v. State, 25 S.W.3d 183 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
362. Id. at 185-86 (citing TEX. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22 § 3(a)); see Vega, 84
S.W.3d at 615.
363. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.01 (Vernon 2002).
364. Vega, 84 S.W.3d at 617.
365. Id. The majority also engaged in renvoi by pointing out that the Illinois choice of
law rule would also apply Texas law to this question. Id. (citing People v. Saiken, 275
N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971)).
366. Id. at 619.
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appeals for an analysis of these issues in light of Texas law. 367
Judge Keller's strenuous dissent (joined by Judges Keasler and Hervey)
argued that the majority erred in creating a confusing double standard for
admissibility of out-of-state confessions. Specifically, the dissent argued
that this would result in adult defendant's confessions being routinely
subjected to Texas law while juveniles' confessions would require a com-
plicated choice of law analysis in each case. Judge Keller pointed out that
Davidson incorrectly reached its conclusion-that the issue of evidentiary
privilege is simply a procedural issue-by applying Restatement (Second)
section 138 (governing evidence). 368 Keller proposed that Davidson be
overruled and that the court of appeals reconsider out-of-state eviden-
tiary privilege under Restatement (Second) section 139, governing privi-
lege. 369 This would produce a single choice of law analysis for the issue of
admissibility of foreign-obtained confessions in Miranda settings.
370
Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Houston General Insurance Co. 371 is an
unpublished decision involving choice of law for an insurance claim aris-
ing from related lawsuits for air, ground and water pollution. Chickasha
is an Arizona-based company that operated The Electric Gin in Com-
merce, Texas. Chickasha allegedly used arsenic as a cotton defoliant
prior to harvesting, with the cotton burr being burned and allegedly re-
leasing arsenic into the atmosphere. Chickasha's neighbor was the Hi-
Yield Chemical Company, a manufacturer and distributor of pesticides
and other products containing arsenic. When hundreds of local residents
sued Chickasha and Hi-Yield in 1995 for release of arsenic into the air,
ground and water, Chickasha sought defense and indemnity from its in-
surance carriers, Houston General, GEICO, and others. The underlying
lawsuits were brought in state district courts in five Texas counties.
372
367. Id.
368. Id. at 625-26.
369. Id. at 625-32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 is entitled
Privileged Communication and provides that (1) evidence not privileged under the local
law of the state with the most significant relationship with the communication will be ad-
mitted, even though it would be privileged under forum law, unless the admission of such
evidence would be contrary to the forum's strong public policy; and (2) evidence privileged
under the local law of the state with the most significant relationship with the communica-
tion but which is not privileged under forum law will be admitted unless there is some
special reason why forum law should not be followed. Under section 139, the court would
have reached the same result-admitting the evidence-but under a somewhat different
and more appropriate analysis.
370. Texas had already recognized this in Gonzalez v. State, 45 S.W.3d 101, 104 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2001) (applicable to confessions from children ages ten to sixteen (and seven-
teen if found in need of supervision)), under TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. §§ 51.01, 51.095
(Vernon 2002). Referring to this, Judge Keller wrote that, "'Unlike other rules of evi-
dence, privileges are not designed primarily to exclude unreliable evidence. In fact, privi-
leges expressly subordinate the goal of truth-seeking to other societal interests.' For this
reason, privileges are more akin to rules pertaining to substantive rights." Vega, 84 S.W.3d
at 626 (Keller, J., dissenting), (quoting Gonzalez, 45 S.W.3d at 106).
371. Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., No. 05-00-01789-CV (Tex.
App.- Dallas 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 1792467.
372. The pollution actions against Chickasha were brought in Dallas, Harris, Jefferson,
Fannin and Hunt counties. Id. at *1.
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The insurers denied coverage, apparently because of disputed policy
dates for the alleged pollution, which had occurred over a period dating
from 1952.
373
Chickasha then sued the insurers for a declaratory judgment that the
insurance policies covered the claims in the related lawsuits. Its claims
included some under Arizona law for bad faith, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a violation of the Arizona
Consumer Fraud Act. 374 The opinion does not indicate the difference
between Texas and Arizona law on these claims. Instead, the court noted
the insurers' objection to the application of Arizona law, then proceeded
directly to a choice of law analysis under the Restatement (Second)'s
most significant relationship test.
The Arizona claims were tort-based and therefore governed by the
principles described in section 6 (the seven-factor balancing test for most
significant relationship) and section 145 (general tort principles). 375 Spe-
cifically, the contacts under section 145 include (a) the place where the
injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury oc-
curred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties; and (d) the place where the relationship,
if any, between the parties is centered. 3
76
Applying these factors, the court found that any injury to Chickasha
occurred in Arizona and the insurers' alleged wrongful conduct occurred
in Texas. Chickasha is a Delaware corporation located in Arizona, while
Houston General and the related Houston General Lloyds are both in-
corporated and located in Texas. GEICO is an Iowa corporation with its
principal place of business in the District of Columbia, and Liberty Mu-
tual is incorporated and located in Massachusetts. The relationship was
centered, the court found, in Texas. Based on this analysis, the Dallas
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's application of Texas law and
rejection of the Arizona claims.
377
Chickasha argued that a federal decision compelled the application of
Arizona law. That case-SnyderGeneral378-involved a similar action to
compel the application of insurance policies to defend and indemnify the
insured. The insurer and the original insured were based in Minnesota,
where the underlying incidents occurred. But a Texas company,
SnyderGeneral, had purchased the Minnesota insured, resulting in a find-
ing that "Texas has a significant interest in matters related to violations of
its insurance laws."'379 Chickasha argued that SnyderGeneral's holding
was essentially that "Texas choice-of-law rules apply 'the laws of the state
373. Id.
374. The opinion does not cite which Arizona statute was pleaded.
375. Id. at *9-10.
376. Id. (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 135(2) (1971)).
377. Id. at *11.
378. SnyderGeneral Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 928 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Tex. 1996),
affd 133 F.3d 373 (5th Cir. 1998).
379. SnyderGeneral, 928 F. Supp. at 678.
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where the policyholder was affected by the alleged bad-faith acts." 380
The Chickasha court appropriately rejected this argument, noting that in
SnyderGeneral the policyholder's location was not per se determinative
and that Texas choice of law rules (under the Restatement) clearly apply
a multi-factor test.381 The court of appeals did not point out that
SnyderGeneral-a federal decision-would not be declarative of Texas
law in any event.
D. OTHER CHOICE OF LAW ISSUES
1. Constitutional Limits on State Choice of Law Rules
Like the due process limitation on state long-arm statutes, 382 the
United States Constitution imposes limits on a state's ability to choose
the governing law in its courts. Unlike the limits on state long-arm stat-
utes (which arise only under the due process clause), the choice of law
limits arise under several doctrines-due process (requiring a reasonable
connection between the dispute and the governing law), full faith and
credit (requiring the choice of law analysis to consider the interests of
other affected states), and to a lesser extent, equal protection, privileges
and immunities, the commerce clause, and the contract clause. 383 Consti-
tutional problems most often occur when a state court chooses its own
law in questionable circumstances. But the inappropriate choice of forum
law is not the only conceivable constitutional issue, and even when choos-
ing foreign law, courts must apply choice of law rules with an eye toward
constitutional limitations.
In National Western Life Insurance Co. v. Rowe, defendant National
argued that the Texas forum could not apply its law to a class action cov-
ering plaintiffs in forty-one states regarding the reimbursement of child-
rider premiums for adult children having passed the age limit. 384 As dis-
cussed above, the Austin Court of Appeals found that Texas law did ap-
ply under the most significant relationship test, and that Texas had a
sufficient connection to the class members and their claims in order to
have its law apply to the entire class.385 National argued that the United
States Supreme Court's opinion in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts386 re-
quired the respective laws of the states of each class member be applied
380. Chickasha, 2002 WL 1792467, at *10.
381. Id.
382. See supra notes 31-37.
383. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 and comments (1971).
See also SCOLES & HAY, supra note 20, at 78-109; WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 585-648;
James P. George, Choice of Law: A Guide for Texas Attorneys, 25 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 833,
844-46 (1994).
384. Nat'l W. Life Ins., 86 S.W.3d at 300-02.
385. Id.
386. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 797. National also argued the "significant aggregation of con-
tacts" requirement from Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981). The court
disposed of this argument with a simple reference to National's Texas contacts already
mentioned in the opinion. 86 S.W.3d at 301-02.
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unless Texas has sufficient contacts with each class member.387 In finding
Shutts inapposite, the court compared the respective contacts. Shutts in-
volved claims by gas-lease royalty owners for interest Phillips had not
paid them while money was escrowed pending federal approval of inter-
state rate increases. Three plaintiffs sued Phillips in a Kansas state court,
purporting to represent class members from all fifty states and several
foreign countries. One named plaintiff was from Kansas, and the 'other
two were from Oklahoma. More than ninety-nine percent of the leases
were outside of Kansas, with eleven percent being in Texas and
Oklahoma. Defendant Phillips Petroleum was also from Oklahoma.
Only 1,000 of the 28,000 plaintiff class members were from Kansas.
388
On these facts, and the plaintiffs' choice of a Kansas forum, the Kansas
supreme court applied a favorable Kansas law to all claims. The United
States Supreme Court reversed, establishing guidelines for the applica-
tion of one state's law to nationwide and international class actions.389 In
National Western, on the other hand, all plaintiff class members had a
connection through defendant's Austin office.
390
A second Survey case considered two related constitutional cases, and
again the issue was extraterritorial application of Texas law to insurance
contracts. In Mayo v. Hartford Life Insurance Co.,391 the Supreme Court
first applied Griffin v. McCoach for the point that "Texas courts have the
constitutional authority to 'refuse enforcement of an insurance contract
where the beneficiaries have no insurable interest on the ground of its
interference with local [Texas] law."'392 Mayo then rejected defendants'
argument that Home Insurance Co. v. Dick393 barred the application of
Texas law to this multi-state class action.394 The court found to the con-
trary, that comparing Home Insurance's lack of Texas contacts with the
significant Texas contacts in Mayo compelled a conclusion favoring plain-
tiffs, not defendants. 395
2. False Conflicts
A false conflict exists when other potentially applicable laws are the
same as the forum's, or at least reach the same result.396 Defining a clear,
387. Nat'l W. Life Ins., 86 S.W.3d at 301-02.
388. Id. at 302. See Phillips, 472 U.S. at 799-800.
389. Nat'l W. Life Ins., 86 S.W.3d at 302; see Phillips, 472 U.S. at 823.
390. Nat'l W. Life Ins., 86 S.W.3d at 302.
391. Mayo v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 220 F. Supp. 2d 714, 731, 739-40.
392. Id. at 731 (quoting Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 506 (1941)).
393. Home Ins. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
394. Id. at 739-40.
395. Id. at 740 & n.65.
396. This is the Restatement's definition of false conflict. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145, cmt. i; id. at § 186, cmt. c. A very different concept of false
conflicts came from Professor Brainerd Currie's government interest analysis, which de-
fines a false conflict as one in which only one state has a real interest. See SCOLES & HAY,
supra note 20 at 16-19. Unfortunately, Texas courts have used both definitions. Cases
applying the Restatement definition (no difference in outcome) include: Texas Employers
Ins. Ass'n v. Borum, 834 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, no writ); Smith v.
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outcome-changing difference between the forum's and the foreign law is
the first step in conducting a choice of law analysis, and the absence of a
clear conflict should result in the application of forum law. 397 The Survey
period produced four noteworthy false conflict cases, the most significant
(in terms of litigation) being Compaq Computer Corp. v. LaPray.
398 This
was a consumer class action regarding computer software, raising claims
of breach of contract and express warranty. Defendant Compaq ap-
pealed the trial court's class certification, arguing that the plaintiff class's
spanning members in several states would require the application of sev-
eral states' laws, thus rendering jury instructions in a single trial unman-
ageable. But Compaq failed to demonstrate any conflict between Texas
law and that of the other states,399 and the Beaumont Court of Appeals
upheld class certification. 4
00
Holley v. Grigg401 involved a conflict between Texas and Missouri law
in a contest over the nontestamentary transfer of a decedent's investment
account. Decedent C.C. Grigg's heirs included four surviving sons, as
well as a granddaughter who was the only child of Grigg's predeceased
fifth son. Grigg's will left his residuary property to his four surviving sons
and his granddaughter. But one of his investments, an Edward Jones ac-
count, appeared to exclude the granddaughter because of Grigg's failure
to elect an option allowing a predeceased beneficiary's share to pass to
Foodmaker, Inc., 928 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, no writ); BDO Seidman v.
Miller, 949 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ dism'd): Turford v. Underwood, 952
S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, no pet.). Cases using Currie's definition include:
the Texas Supreme Court's Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co, 665 S.W.2d 414, 422 (Tex. 1984)
(not a precedent-setting use); Ford Motor Co. v. Aguiniga, 9 S.W.3d 252, 260-61 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied); and DeAguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1414
(5th Cir. 1995, cert. denied). The United States Supreme Court's only application em-
ployed the Restatement usage; see Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 823-45 (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). Currie's definition does not fit well with states like
Texas that also use the Restatement (Second)'s most significant relationship test. Currie's
false conflict analysis is conclusive-if one of two states is found to lack any interest in the
dispute, the court should apply the law of the only state having an interest. On the other
hand, under the most significant relationship test, the relative degree of states' interests is
merely one of seven factors to be balanced in the choice of law analysis. See supra note
308 for the seven factors. Currie's use of the term "false conflict" may have been nothing
more than the label he applied after the interest balancing was completed, often reaching
the same result as the Restatement would (that is, Currie and the Restatement are them-
selves a false conflict, but only under the Restatement's definition). Nonetheless, Currie's
approach is confusing, over-emphasizes state interest, and even if it works in California
and New Jersey, should not be used with the most significant relationship test.
397. Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 823-45 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
398. Compaq Computer Corp., v. LaPray, 79 S.W.3d 779 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002,
pet. filed).
399. Id. at 791-92. Compaq's only reference to conflicting laws was a citation to several
federal cases applying federal law. The court rejected this, stating that "Compaq fails to
explain how a conflict, if any, between Texas law and federal law necessitates this court
finding a conflict between Texas law and the laws of other states." Id. at 792.
400. Id. at 794.
401. Holley v. Grigg, 65 S.W.3d 289 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, no pet.). This case is




that beneficiary's children. The four sons sued, seeking a declaratory
judgment that the Jones account did not pass to Grigg's granddaughter.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the sons, and the grand-
daughter appealed.
The Edward Jones contract designated Missouri law, both for validity
and effect. Pertinent were the laws governing nontestamentary transfers,
and the Eastland Court of Appeals finding that Texas law was "essentially
the same" as Missouri law.40 2 The court thereafter applied Texas statutes
and cases to affirm the trial court's summary judgment. In reaching that
decision, however, the court noted a second false conflict between Mis-
souri and Texas laws. The granddaughter argued that the Jones agree-
ment violated the Texas nontestamentary transfer statute by transferring
the property to the four sons, contrary to the Texas statute's reference to
payment after death "to a person designated by the decedent .... -403
The court of appeals noted that both Texas and Missouri law provide that
statutory references to the singular include the plural and the plural in-
cludes the singular unless expressly provided otherwise.
40 4
In Schneider National Transport v. Ford Motor Company,40 5 the Fifth
Circuit reversed a federal district court's finding that Pennsylvania law
governed the interpretation of insurance contracts at issue. The circuit
court found instead that Pennsylvania and Texas law were the same, both
endorsing the plain meaning rule that produced the trial court's
opinion.
406
United States ex rel. Wilkins v. North American Construction Corp.
407
briefly discussed a false conflict in a federal qui tam action relating to the
construction of a groundwater treatment facility at Tinker Air Force Base
in Oklahoma City. The lawsuit was brought under the False Claims
Act 40 8 and included a separate common law fraud claim. One defendant
raised, but did not argue, a question of which law governed the non-fed-
eral fraud claim-Texas (both as the forum and a state with party con-
tacts), Oklahoma (as the performance site), or federal common law
(based on the primary federal claim). The court first dispensed with fed-
eral common law, noting that no party had established the threshold nec-
essary to compel its application. 40 9 The court ended the discussion with a
402. Id. at 294-95.
403. Id. at 292, 294 (discussing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 450 (Vernon 2003) (emphasis
added)).
404. Id. at 294 (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 312.003(b) (Vernon 1998) and Mo.
REV. STAT. § 1.030 (2000)).
405. Schneider Nat'l Transp. v. Ford Motor Co., 280 F.3d 532 (5th Cir. 2002); see supra
notes 325-33 for additional discussion of this case.
406. Id. at 536.
407. United States ex rel. Wilkins v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 2d 601 (S.D.
Tex. 2001).
408. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3730 (2002).
409. The court noted that "[a] federal court may fashion federal common-law rules only
upon a specific showing that the use of state law will create a significant conflict with, or
threat to, some federal policy or interest." Id. at 630-31, (citing Atherton v. FDIC, 519
U.S. 213, 214 (1997), in turn citing O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994)).
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showing that Texas and Oklahoma law did not materially differ as to the
elements of fraud.410 The court thereafter applied Texas law to the com-
mon law fraud issues.
411
In re J.D. Edwards World Solutions Co. also uses a false conflicts analy-
sis after finding that Texas law did not govern, and that the remaining
possibilities of Colorado, the Federal Arbitration Act, and the Uniform
Arbitration Act produced the same result.
4 12
3. Limitations
When should the forum apply its limitations and repose periods to
claims arising under foreign law? Courts, legislatures, and scholars have
wrestled with this in the past few years, producing the Uniform Conflict
of Laws-Limitations Act413 and a 1986 revision to the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws section 142.414 The Texas legislature
amended its wrongful death statute in 1997 to add a borrowing statute
calling for the application of the situs state's and the Texas limitations
period.
4 15
In Gilcrease v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp.,4 16 the San Antonio Court of
Appeals faced a question of first impression regarding Texas's new bor-
rowing statute-whether it applies to foreign statutes of repose. When
Fred Gilcrease discovered he had mesothelioma in 1999, he and his wife
sued thirty-six oil refineries where he had worked over the years. Defen-
dant Tesoro Petroleum Corporation owned a refinery in Kenai, Alaska,
where Fred had worked in 1974 and 1980. The Gilcreases filed the action
in Texas even though Fred had never worked at a Texas refinery and the
Gilcreases lived in Oregon at the time of filing. Texas law permits non-
resident plaintiffs to sue in Texas for wrongs occurring outside of Texas if
suit is filed within the time allowed by Texas and by the laws of the state
or country where the act occurred.417 Tesoro pleaded Alaska's ten year
410. Id. at 631.
411. Id. at 645-48.
412. In re J.D. Edwards World Solutions Co., 87 S.W.3d 546, 550 (Tex. 2002).
413. The Uniform Act provides that (1) a claim substantively based on the law of one
state is governed by that state's limitations period, (2) a claim substantively based on the
law of more than one state is governed by the limitations period of the state designated by
the forum state's choice of law rule, and (3) all other claims are subject to the forum state's
choice of law rule. See UNIF. CONFLICT1I OF LAws-LIMITATIONS ACT § 2, 12 U.L.A. 158
(1996). The Act also has an unfairness clause that allows the forum state to ignore the
governing limitations period of another state if a party had no fair opportunity to sue on
the claim. Id. at § 4.
414. The 1986 revision provides that "[an action will be maintained if it is not barred
by the statute of limitations of the forum unless the action would be barred in some other
state, which, with respect to the issue of limitations, has a more significant relationship to
the parties and the occurrence." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142
(1986 Revision).
415. See Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 424, § 3, eff. May 29, 1997. For a discussion of bor-
rowing statutes, see WEINTRAUB, supra note 1 at 65-66, 70-77.
416. Gilcrease v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 70 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2001, pet. denied).
417. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. COoE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
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statute of repose and was awarded summary judgment. Plaintiffs
appealed.
The court of appeals first examined Texas law regarding foreign per-
sonal injury and wrongful death claims. Drawing from the Texas Su-
preme Court's 2000 analysis, the court recited that the original statute in
1913 merely permitted Texas citizens the remedy of suing in Texas for
wrongful conduct occurring elsewhere. 418 In 1985, the Texas legislature
consolidated the 1913 statute with related remedies and codified it as sec-
tion 71.031 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, without im-
posing foreign time limits. 419 The result was a perceived abuse of Texas
courts by foreign plaintiffs bringing actions with no connection to Texas
other than defendant's amenability to Texas jurisdiction. As the Gil-
crease opinion explains, a California resident could sue in Texas based on
wrongful conduct in California as long as the Texas limitation period had
not run.420 This led to a 1997 amendment that added the borrowing lan-
guage currently found in section 71.031, which now requires foreign per-
sonal injury and wrongful death plaintiffs to satisfy the time limits of both
Texas and the situs of the wrong.
421
The court of appeals then turned to section 71.031's legislative history,
concluding that the 1997 amendment's purpose was to prevent forum
shopping, and that this intent necessarily included the application of for-
eign statutes of repose. 422 Having ventured into new territory, the court
had yet further to go, now with Alaska law-if the Alaska statute of re-
pose applied, did it bar plaintiffs' claims dating from 1974 and 1980? The
court examined several aspects of Alaska's statute and its exceptions and
found that it barred plaintiffs' claim. 423 Readers should note that the San
Antonio Court of Appeals was in no position to apply Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws section 142 (applying to statutes of limitation,
and not yet adopted by the Texas Supreme Court) because of a more
specific borrowing statute that applied here, that is, section 71.031. In
another Survey period case, the Texas Supreme Court refused to consider
adopting section 142 because the requesting party had failed to brief it.424
4. Choice of Law in Complex Cases
In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation425 is a multi-
418. See Act of April 8, 1913, ch. 161, § 1, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 338, 338; Act of March
30, 1917, ch. 156, § 1, 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws 365, 365, discussed at Gilcrease, 70 S.W.3d at
268-69 (citing Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 76-78 (Tex. 2000)).
419. Act 1985, ch. 959, § 1 eff. Sept. 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3242, 3297.
420. Gilcrease, 20 S.W.3d at 268.
421. Id. at 269.
422. id.
423. Id. at 269-72. The court considered the claim's accrual date, the Alaska statute's
hazardous waste exception, and a foreign bodies tolling provision, and found that none
applied.
424. Monsanto Co. v. Boustany, 73 S.W.3d 225, 229 (Tex. 2002), discussed supra notes
281-89 and accompanying text.




district litigation (MDL) case in which the court decided to apply the
choice of law rules of the various state from which the cases were trans-
ferred. MDL cases are created under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, which authorizes
the transfer and consolidation of related cases for the limited purpose of
resolving pretrial matters. 426 This MDL case began in 1994 when
thousands of lawsuit were filed against various manufacturers of Nor-
plant, an implanted prescription contraceptive. In December, 1994, the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered the transfer of all fed-
eral Norplant cases to the Eastern District of Texas for pretrial mat-
ters.427 The Wyeth defendants 428 filed a motion for partial summary
judgment regarding causation and the duty to warn. Specifically, defend-
ants raised the learned intermediary doctrine-an exception to the man-
ufacturers' duty to warn-as an affirmative defense.429 The doctrine, of
course, varies from state to state, and the summary judgment's resolution
depended on which states' laws governed.
Choice of law is an issue in any case touching more than one state, but
special problems arise in MDL cases. First, the transferee court must ap-
ply the transferor court's respective laws. In federal question cases this
means applying the law from each federal circuit, but in a diversity case, it
means applying some state's law. This raises the second problem: a fed-
eral court applying state law must use the choice of law rule of the state in
which that federal court sits. This is true for all diversity cases, but in
transfers under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 as well as MDL cases, the transferee
federal court must apply the choice of law rule of the state from which
the case was transferred. This was in turn complicated by the learned
intermediary doctrine's piecemeal application-both the duty to warn
and its exceptions varied with different side effects suffered by the vic-
tims, and then varied again according to which state's law governed.
Fortunately, the cases involving the Wyeth defendants implicated only
the states of New York, New Jersey, and Illinois. Even that analysis is too
lengthy to review, but briefly, the court ruled that (1) the New Jersey
choice of law rule dictated the application of New Jersey law to claims
filed in New Jersey by plaintiffs receiving the implants elsewhere; 430 and
(2) under New York and Illinois choice of law rules, New Jersey law gov-
erned the failure-to-warn issue for claims filed in New York or Illinois by
plaintiffs receiving the implants in New Jersey.431 The court then applied
426. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1993).
427. Norplant, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 800.
428. Id. at 795. The Wyeth defendants included American Home Products Corpora-
tion, Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, Inc., and Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.
429. Id. at 803 (citing Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974); Ster-
ling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966)). "Under the doctrine, a drug
'manufacturer is excused from warning each patient who receives the product when the
manufacturer properly warns the prescribing physician of the product's dangers."' Nor-
plant, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 803 (quoting Porterfield v. Ethicon, Inc., 183 F.3d 464, 467-68 (5th
Cir. 1999), in turn citing Aim v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 717 S.W.2d 588, 591-92 (Tex.
1986)).
430. Norplant, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 812-18.
431. Id. at 818-21.
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these conclusions to reach a partial summary judgment that is also too
complex for this brief summary. The opinion appears well reasoned, es-
pecially in light of the difficulty of applying New York's government in-
terest analysis and New Jersey's bifurcated rules including both the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and a government interest
analysis. The court simplified this by characterizing the government in-
terest approach as focused on contacts that implicate the state's laws,
which leads back to a Restatement-like analysis.
432
National Western Life Insurance Co. v. Rowe, discussed in two sections
above, also illustrates choice of law in complex cases. 433 Unlike the
multi-state choice of law analysis in Norplant, the Austin Court of Ap-
peals held in National Western that the law of one state, Texas, governed a
class action involving plaintiffs in forty-one states claiming insurance re-
imbursement for child-rider premiums.
5. Proof of Foreign Law
Litigants seeking the application of another state's or nation's law must
comply with the forum's rules for pleading and proving foreign law. In
both Texas and federal courts, judicial notice is sufficient for the applica-
tion of sister-states' laws.434 Foreign country law, on the other hand,
must be adequately pleaded and proven. 4
35
Long Distance International, Inc. v. Telefonos de Mexico, S.A. de
C.V.436 was a business dispute regarding 1-800 service between Mexico
and the United States. In 1976, the Mexican government gave a thirty-
year exclusive concession to Telefonos de Mexico ("Telmex") to provide
telephone service in Mexico, but in 1990 amended the concession to allow
432. Id. at 813 (New Jersey) & 818-19 (New York).
433. Nat'l W. Life Ins. Co. v. Rowe, 86 S.W.3d 285 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).
See supra notes 346, 351-55 and accompanying text, and supra notes 384-90 and accompa-
nying text.
434. Texas Rule of Evidence 202 allows a Texas court to take judicial notice of sister
states' laws on its own motion and requires it to do so upon a party's motion. Parties must
supply "sufficient information" for the court to comply. Id. Federal practice is the same
under federal common law; neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure address judicial notice of American states' laws. See Lamar v. Micou, 114
U.S. 218, 223 (1885); Kucel v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 813 F.2d 67, 74 (5th Cir. 1987). Even
though Federal Rule of Evidence 201 (the sole federal evidence rule dealing with judicial
notice) does not apply to states' laws, we should assume that Lamar's judicial notice man-
date for American states' laws is subject to Rule 201(b)'s provision for proof of matters
"capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned." That is, federal courts may take judicial notice of American
states' laws from (1) official statutory and case reports, (2) widely-used unofficial versions,
or (3) copies-all subject to evidentiary rules on authentication and best evidence.
435. TEX. R. EvID. 203 requires written notice of foreign law by pleading or other rea-
sonable notice at least thirty days before trial, including all written materials or sources
offered as proof. For non-English originals, parties must provide copies of both the origi-
nal and the English translation. Sources include affidavits, testimony, briefs, treatises, and
any other material source, whether or not submitted by a party, and whether or not other-
wise admissible under the Texas Rules of Evidence. Federal practice is similar. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 44.1.




for eventual transition to a competitive telecommunications market, as
reflected in this case. Southwestern Bell Corporation owns ten percent of
Telmex, and its subsidiary SBC International ("SBI") assists Telmex's
operations.
In 1992, Telmex entered agreements with several United States carri-
ers, including MCI, to provide international 1-800 service. Although 1-
800 calls are ordinarily free to the caller and billed to the receiver, inter-
national calls necessarily involve more than one carrier and split billing.
The various telephone service providers reached fee-splitting agreements
for three categories of 1-800 service. The first category was "end users,"
that is, United States customers (usually businesses) who give their 1-800
numbers to Mexican callers who can then call the end user to purchase
goods or services. For these calls, MCI billed the end user for the entire
call, then reimbursed Telmex for the Mexican portion.
The second category involved other United States telephone compa-
nies, including plaintiff Long Distance International ("LDI"), who had
contracted through larger providers such as MCI to selll-800 access di-
rectly to Mexican customers. The Mexican customers would call the
LDI-provided number, then be switched by MCI to another number in
order to reach the end use in the United States. For these calls, LDI
would bill the Mexican caller directly and pay a portion to MCI, which
would in turn reimburse Telmex for the Mexican portion of the call. In
this second category, Telmex could only set the rate for the portion in
Mexico, and not for the entire call as it could in the first category.
The third category involved "call-back" services, where the Mexican
customer would call an end user in the United States, which would record
the caller's number without answering the call, and then implement a call
back that gave the Mexican caller a dial tone to call anywhere in the
United States. As with the second category, the United States provider
would bill the Mexican customer directly, but because the original call
from Mexico went unanswered, Telmex received nothing for the original
call, and only a portion for the call back.
In 1993, a Mexican regulatory agency notified MCI that the call back
scheme was illegal under Mexican law, and requested that MCI suspend
that third category of service. In 1994, Telmex also notified MCI of the
third category's illegality and asked for a list of MCI's customers so that
Telmex could disconnect them. MCI refused to furnish the list, claiming
illegality under United States law, and requesting copies of the pertinent
Mexican laws. In July, 1994, Telmex began disconnecting certain Mexican
residents' telephone numbers that it determined were being used in this
third category, including some numbers linked to plaintiff LDI.
LDI sued Telmex and SBI in 1996, alleging breach of contract and re-
lated commercial torts. Telmex and SBI raised the affirmative defense of
category three's illegality under Mexican law, and on that basis won a
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summary judgment.437 The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed, 438
but the Texas supreme court reversed, finding that LDI's contracts did
not violate Mexican law. The case was remanded to determine if defend-
ants should have summary judgment on any other asserted ground.
In spite of the reversal, the Texas Supreme Court endorsed several im-
portant points about the application of foreign country law. First, the
proof of foreign law is akin to a hybrid rule resembling the presentation
of evidence but decided as a question of law.439 Second, summary judg-
ment is available, if there is no dispute that all pertinent foreign law was
properly submitted, even where the parties or experts disagree on the
foreign law's application to the facts.440 Third, the trial court's determi-
nation of foreign law is reviewed de novo.441 On remand, the court of
appeals issued an opinion on March 13, 2002, that was later withdrawn
when the parties settled and requested dismissal.
442
Exxon Corp. v. Breezevale Ltd.443 illustrates a more fundamental as-
pect of Rule 203-failure to comply bars the application of foreign law.
This was a contract action regarding Exxon's hiring of London-based
Breezevale to assist Exxon in obtaining oil exploration rights off the
Nigerian coast. Breezevale provided a range of services-arranging ap-
pointments, conducting briefings, obtaining information and technical
data on available deepwater blocks, and speaking with Nigerian govern-
ment officials-for several months with no formal agreement, hoping to
share in the profits rather than receive fixed compensation. Based on a
series of negotiations, Breezevale later claimed an agreement giving it a
two-and-a-half percent working interest in the Nigerian operation. Ex-
xon disagreed and argued that no essential agreement was ever reached.
In any event, there was no writing.
444
Among other things, Exxon argued that the Texas statute of frauds pre-
cluded enforcement of this oral agreement involving an interest in
land.445 Breezevale responded that the Texas statute of frauds could not
be applied to an agreement involving real property in another country,
and that the issue was instead governed by the law of the property's si-
tus. 446 Fatal to Breezevale's argument was its failure to give notice or
437. Id. at 350.
438. 18 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. granted), rev'd 49 S.W.3d 347.
439. Long Distance Int'l, 49 S.W.3d at 351 (citing Ahumada v. Dow Chem. Co., 992
S.W.2d 555, 558 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); Lawrenson v. Global
Marine, Inc., 869 S.W.2d 519, 525 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ denied)).
440. Id. (citing Bridas Corp. v. Unocal Corp. 16 S.W.3d 893, 896 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied)).
441. Id. (citing TEX. R. EVID. 203); El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Minco Oil & Gas, Inc., 8
S.W.3d 309, 312 (Tex. 1999)).
442. Long Distance Int'l, Inc. v. Telefonos de Mexico, S.A., No. 04-98-00873-CV, 2002
WL 1999754 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
443. Exxon Corp. v. Breezevale Ltd., 82 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, pet.
filed)
444. Id. at 434-35.
445. Id. at 435-36.
446. Id. at 437.
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proof of Nigerian law under Texas Rule 203, thus invoking the presump-
tion that foreign law is the same as the forum's.447 The Dallas Court of
Appeals accordingly applied the Texas statute of frauds.
III. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Foreign judgments from other states and countries create Texas conflict
of laws issues in two ways: (1) their local enforcement, and (2) their
preclusive effect on local lawsuits. Foreign judgments include those from
sister states and foreign country judgments, but do not include federal
court judgments from districts outside Texas because those judgments are
enforced as local federal court judgments.
448
A. ENFORCEMENT
Texas recognizes two methods of enforcing foreign judgments: the
common law method using the foreign judgment as the basis for a local
lawsuit,449 and, since 1981, the more direct procedure under the two uni-
form judgments Acts. There were no instances of common law enforce-
ment during the Survey period.450 The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act ("UEFJA") provide for summary enforcement of non-
Texas judgments that are entitled to full faith and credit.451 This includes
sister-state judgments as well as foreign country money judgments that
Texas recognizes under the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgment
Recognition Act (UFCMJRA). 452
447. Id. (citing Telmex, 49 S.W.3d 347, 350, discussed supra immediately prior to this
case, and also citing Pellow v. Cade, 990 S.W.2d 307, 313 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no
pet.) for the proposition that unproven foreign law is the same as Texas law)); see also
Humphrey v. Bullock, 666 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Creavin v. Moloney, 773 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied);
Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1990).
448. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (Supp. 2002).
449. The underlying mandate for the common law enforcement is the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, and its statutory
counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act specifically reserves the common law method as an alternative; see TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CooE ANN. § 35.008 (Vernon 1997).
450. Examples of common law enforcement after the UEFJA's enactment include Mc-
Fadden v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 689 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no
writ); Cal Growers, Inc. v. Palmer Warehouse & Transfer Co., 687 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ); First Nat'l Bank v. Rector, 710 S.W.2d 100 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Escalona v. Combs, 712 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ); Keller v. Nevel, 699 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. 1985).
451. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. COoE ANN. § 35.001-.007 (Vernon 1997). Section 35.003
requires the judgment creditor to file a copy of the judgment authenticated under federal
or Texas law. Sections 35.004 and 35.003 require notice to the judgment debtor from the
clerk, or the judgment creditor. Section 35.006 provides that the judgment debtor may
move to stay enforcement if grounds exist under the law of Texas or the rendering state.
Section 35.003 provides that the debtor may challenge enforcement along traditional full
faith and credit grounds such as the rendering state's lack of personal or subject matter
jurisdiction.
452. TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.001-.008 (Vernon 1997). Like the
UEFJA, the UFCMJRA requires the judgment creditor to file a copy of the foreign coun-
try judgment that has been authenticated under federal or Texas law (§ 36.0041), with no-
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1. The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act
The Survey period's one reported case provided a good review of
UEFJA procedures and an interesting question concerning the gray area
between jurisdiction and judgments on the merits. Cash Register Sales
and Services of Houston, Inc. v. Copelco Capital, Inc.453 arose from a New
Jersey default judgment against Cash Register Sales and Services of
Houston, Inc. ("CRS"). The New Jersey dispute concerned CRS's lease
of equipment from Minolta, which had then assigned the lease to Copelco
Capital, Inc. Copelco sued CRS in a New Jersey state court for failure to
make lease payments, obtaining a default judgment for $3,557.28 and
costs of $131.15. Copelco then domesticated the New Jersey judgment in
Texas by filing a notice of domestication of foreign judgment in state
court in Harris County.454 CRS responded with a motion to vacate for
lack of jurisdiction, 455 supported by affidavits from CRS's president,
Brian Smith, and its bookkeeper, Sue Domicolo. The trial court denied
CRS's motion and CRS appealed.
456
The Houston Court of Appeals began by explaining the full faith and
credit basis for simplified enforcement of foreign judgments. The federal
constitution requires that a state give the same force and effect to a judg-
ment of a sister state as it would its own.457 The resulting procedure is
that a judgment creditor files an authenticated copy of the foreign judg-
ment, which is prima facie evidence of a valid, enforceable judgment.
The burden then shifts to the judgment debtor to show the judgment is
unenforceable, that is, not entitled to full faith and credit, along one of
four grounds: (1) the foreign court lacked jurisdiction over the judgment
debtor or, for in rem actions, the property; (2) the foreign court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction (under its own law); (3) no jurisdiction to enter
the particular judgment that was entered; and (4) no capacity to act as a
tice to the debtor provided either by the clerk, (§ 36.0042), or the creditor, (§ 36.0043).
The judgment debtor has thirty days to challenge enforcement, or sixty if domiciled in a
foreign country, with a twenty-day extension available for good cause. Id. § 36.0044. Un-
like the UEFJA, the UFCMJRA explicitly states ten grounds for non-recognition-three
mandatory and seven discretionary. Briefly stated, the mandatory grounds are (1) lack of
an impartial tribunal, (2) lack of personal jurisdiction, and (3) lack of subject matter juris-
diction. Id. § 36.005(a). The discretionary grounds for non-recognition are that the foreign
action (1) involved inadequate notice, (2) was obtained by fraud, (3) violates Texas public
policy, (4) is contrary to another final judgment, (5) is contrary to the parties' agreement
(e.g., a contrary forum selection clause), (6) was in an inconvenient forum, and (7) is not
from a country granting reciprocal enforcement rights. Id. § 36.005(b). The UFCMJRA
also provides for stays, (§ 36.007), and expressly reserves the right of enforcement of non-
money judgments under traditional, non-statutory standards, (§ 36.008). See Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (comity as discretionary grounds for recognizing and enforcing
foreign country judgments).
453. Cash Register Sales & Serv. of Houston, Inc. v. Copelco Capital, Inc., 62 S.W.3d
278 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
454. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003(a) & (b) (Vernon 1997).
455. Id. § 35.003(c).
456. Cash Register Sales, 62 S.W.3d at 280.
457. U.S. CoNsr., art. IV, § 1.
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court.458 The enforcement proceeding on a sister-state judgment may not
be used to relitigate the merits of the original action,459 and the burden of
proof for factual issues establishing these legal defenses is clear and con-
vincing evidence.
460
Judgment debtor CRS attempted to object to New Jersey's personal
jurisdiction but nonetheless confronted the merits. CRS argued that it
had never done anything in New Jersey that would subject it to the per-
sonal jurisdiction of New Jersey's courts, and in particular, that within the
past five years it had never purchased any goods or services from New
Jersey, transacted any business with anyone in New Jersey, agreed to be
sued in New Jersey or appeared in a court there, and never entered into a
contract with anyone there (including Plaintiff Copelco). 46 1 CRS con-
ceded that bookkeeper Domicolo signed several documents upon receiv-
ing the equipment at issue, including a rental agreement, and that the
rental agreement contained both choice of forum and choice of law
clauses designating New Jersey. But CRS argued that Domicolo's signing
of the agreement was invalid because she lacked authority to bind CRS,
and that even if she had authority, her signing was fraudulently
induced.
462
The First District Court of Appeals found this to be an attack on fact
issues that went to the merits of the case rather than merely to personal
jurisdiction. It therefore declined to adjudicate whether Domicolo had
authority to bind CRS, and affirmed the trial court's enforcement of the
New Jersey judgment against CRS.463 Justice Nuchia dissented on the
grounds that the only basis for finding CRS amenable to New Jersey ju-
risdiction was the choice of forum clause in the rental agreement, and
that CRS's denial of Domicolo's authority to sign the agreement created
a litigable objection.4 64 Both the Nuchia dissent and the majority opinion
briefly refer to the lease agreement's original signing by CRS's Domicolo
and agents for Minolta, which then assigned the lease to Copelco.
465
These facts are not further explained, but CRS apparently contended that
Minolta misrepresented certain features of the lease agreement, and that
Domicolo relied on this when she signed the agreement and accepted the
goods. Justice Nuchia's dissent notes that Copelco never controverted
CRS's affidavit denying contacts with New Jersey, and concludes as a re-
sult that the only basis was the New Jersey choice of forum clause alleg-
458. Cash Register Sales, at 283 (citing Ranger Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 530 S.W.2d 162, 167
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). Note that foreign judgment enforcement
under the common law was the same prior to Texas's adoption of the UEFJA, and here,
the court mingles common law and UEFJA cases.
459. Id. (citing Strick Lease, Inc. v. Cutler, 759 S.W.2d 776, 777 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1988, no writ) and other cases).
460. Id. at 281 (citing Escalona v. Combs, 712 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1986, no writ)).
461. Id.
462. Id. at 282.
463. Id. at 283.
464. Id. at 283-84.
465. Id. at 282-83 (majority), and 284 (Nuchia, J., dissenting).
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edly fraudulently-induced agreement. This, according to Justice Nuchia,
deserves adjudication.
466
On the other hand, as the majority pointed out, it is undisputed that
Domilico signed the Minolta agreement, and that the agreement con-
tained a New Jersey choice of forum clause. 467 That leaves an interesting
question of whether the resulting objections to (1) Domicolo's agency sta-
tus for CRS, and (2) the allegations of fraudulent inducement, are objec-
tions to jurisdiction or to the merits of the case. To the extent that
personal jurisdiction was based on nothing more than the contract's
choice of forum clause, both arguments seem plausible, or better, have
merit.
2. The Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgment Recognition Act
Society of Lloyd's v. Turner4 68 is the enforcement of several English
judgments to collect reinsurance premiums from Lloyd's underwriters,
known as Names.469 The dispute began when the Lloyd's insurance syn-
dicate lost billions of dollars as a result of toxic tort cases. To offset these
losses, Lloyd's engaged in a Reconstruction and Renewal plan that in-
volved, among other things, the obtaining of reinsurance from an inde-
pendent company, Equitas Reinsurance, Ltd., to be funded from
reinsurance premiums paid by the Names.470 The plan had a "pay now,
sue later" provision that ensured the quick funding of the R & R plan
that would allow the Lloyd's market to continue. Most of the Names-95
percent-accepted the R & R reinsurance plan; five percent did not, in-
cluding Duncan Webb and Percy Turner, both Texas residents. For the
noncompliant Names, Lloyd's appointed a substitute agent who accepted
on their behalf, and Lloyd's paid the premiums. In 1996, Lloyd's brought
collection actions in England against the non-paying Names, including
Webb and Turner. Turner defended and Webb defaulted.
471
After a lengthy series of cases in English courts, the Lloyd's R & R
plan was upheld and final judgments were entered against Webb, Turner,
and other noncompliant Names. Lloyd's then brought enforcement ac-
tions against Webb and Turner in separate divisions of the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas, under the UFCMJRA. Webb and Turner challenged the
filing, asking for summary judgment against enforcement. Lloyd's filed
its cross motion for summary judgment and won in both courts. The
cases were consolidated on appeal.
472
Webb and Turner challenged both the due process of the English litiga-
466. Id. at 284.
467. Id. at 282-83.
468. Society of Lloyd's v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2002).
469. See id. at 326-27 (quoting Haynsworth v. Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 958-59 (5th Cir.
1997)).
470. Society of Lloyd's, 303 F.3d at 326-28.
471. Id. at 328.
472. Id. at 329.
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tion 473 and its repugnancy to Texas public policy. 474 The due process
challenge failed to specify any deficiencies with the English courts and
instead attacked the Lloyd's self-regulatory system.475 The Fifth Circuit
court nonetheless analyzed this objection in regard to the English courts,
and found that the UFCMJRA requires only a system of impartial tribu-
nals and procedures compatible with due process of law. This is "inter-
preted . . . to mean that the foreign procedures [must only be]
'fundamentally fair' and ... not offend against 'basic unfairness.'"476 The
circuit court further pointed out that the origins of our concept of due
process are English, and concluded that this was no basis for objection.
477
Defendants' public policy argument was that English law required
proof of only two elements to establish a contract breach, while Texas law
requires four.478 Observing that the standard for public policy contraven-
tion must be high, the court explained that contrary to defendants' argu-
ment the public policy violation must go to the repugnancy of the foreign
cause of action itself, not just on its distinction from a similar Texas
claim. 479 The court cited Southwest Livestock & Trucking Co. v. Ra-
mon, 480 where a Mexican judgment on a promissory note with a forty-
eight percent interest rate was upheld because the cause of action to col-
lect on a promissory note did not offend Texas public policy. In this case,
the action against Webb and Turner was for breach of contract, a claim
recognized under Texas law.481 Accordingly, the trial courts' summary
judgments favoring enforcement were affirmed.
482
In Brosseau v. Ranzau,483 the Beaumont court of appeals applied the
UFCMJRA as persuasive authority on the issue of the collateral estoppel
effect to be given a Mexican judgment. This is more fully discussed im-
mediately below and is not directly applicable to this Uniform Act discus-
sion because the plaintiff was not seeking the enforcement of a money
judgment.
473. Id. at 329-30 (invoking TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 36.005(a)(1)). See supra
note 451.
474. Id. at 331-32 (invoking TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 36.005(b)(3)). See supra
note 451.
475. Id. at 331 n.22.
476. Id. at 330 (alterations in original).
477. Id. at 331.
478. English law requires a showing that a contract exists and the amount owed, but
Texas law requires proof of (1) the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance, (3) defendant's
breach, and (4) damages. Id. at 332.
479. Id. at 331-32.
480. S.W. Livestock & Trucking Co. v. Ramon, 169 F.3d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 1999).
481. Society of Lloyd's, 303 F.3d at 332-33 (citing Wright v. Christian & Smith, 950
S.W.2d 411,412 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ) for the elements of contract
breach under Texas law, and Hunt v. BP Exploration Co., 492 F. Supp. 885, 901 (N.D. Tex.
1980), for the point that Texas public policy does not reject foreign causes of action merely
because they differ in elements or proof).
482. Id. at 333.




Both sister-state and foreign country judgments are entitled to preclu-
sive effect in Texas courts. The full faith and credit clause compels full
faith and credit for valid and final sister-state judgments involving the
same parties and claims, as well as collateral estoppel if the required ele-
ments are satisfied. 484 Under the doctrine of comity, foreign country
judgments may also be given res judicata and preclusive effect, subject to
discretion based on the nature of the foreign proceeding and satisfaction
of traditional preclusion requirements.
485
1. Interstate Preclusion
There were no reported interstate preclusion cases during the Survey
period.
2. International Preclusion
The only noteworthy case regarding international preclusion reported
in the Survey period-Brosseau v. Ranzau 486-considers the collateral
estoppel effect to be given a Mexican judgment, which itself was based on
prior Texas state court judgments. This complicated, decade-long dispute
humbles the intricacies of the other cases reported in this Survey.
Ranzau and Brosseau formed a partnership in the 1980s when they de-
cided to pool their money to buy a house in Acapulco, known as Casa T,
that rented for $1,500 a day. Each paid the owner $60,000 down and co-
signed a note for $800,000. Brosseau claimed he did not have the time to
draw up partnership papers, and with Ranzau's permission the financing
went through one of Brosseau's companies, Argos Properties, Inc. This
resulted in Argos being Casa T's sole listed owner, and Ranzau having
later to prove an oral partnership with Brosseau. 487 A further complica-
tion was the nature of the property. Although the parties' interest was
directed to real property in Acapulco, the ownership was defined by a
single share of stock representing the seller's Canadian corporation,
known as 80451 Holdings, Ltd. This single share was sold to Argos and
financed by a promissory note pledged to First State Bank of Liberty, in
Liberty, Texas.
488
Ranzau became concerned that Brosseau was not properly accounting
for Casa T's expenses and income. After several requests and Brosseau's
resulting nondisclosures, Ranzau sued in state district court in Liberty
County, Texas, for breach of their partnership agreement, breach of fidu-
ciary duty, fraud, and the appointment of a receiver. 489 In April, 1989,
484. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 701-02; see also 28
U.S.C. § 1738.
485. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 20 at 999-1001.
486. Brosseau v. Ranzau, 81 S.W.3d 381 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, pet. filed).





the trial court appointed a receiver to take charge of property, but the
note-holder Liberty Bank soon failed and the FDIC (as bank receiver)
removed Ranzau's claim to federal court. As part of a settlement, Bros-
seau and his company Argos conveyed Casa T-or more properly, the
80451 stock-to the FDIC, which in turn conveyed title to the Liberty
court receiver when Ranzau's action was remanded there.490
Other lawsuits emerged. Brosseau's wife Teresa began a divorce action
in Dallas County and to perfect her claim to the Casa T property, inter-
vened in Ranzau's Liberty County action in April, 1991. 4 91 In the divorce
action, Teresa and one of the Brosseau's children's trusts agreed to sell
the any interest they had in Casa T to Ranzau, although the divorce court
eventually declared that Casa T was the property of the Brosseau's chil-
dren.492 This ruling had no effect on Ranzau because he was not a party
to that action, and Teresa's intervention in the Liberty case did not pro-
duce that result.493 Additionally, Brosseau filed for bankruptcy in Octo-
ber, 1991, but Ranzau bought any interest Brosseau might have from the
trustee.
494
Back in Liberty, in November, 1991, the trial court entered an interloc-
utory judgment for Ranzau, finding that a partnership existed, and that
the partners owned the property as tenants in common. The trial court
awarded Ranzau $307,196.76 in actual and exemplary damages; at a later
hearing in August, 1992, the Liberty court found that Brosseau had di-
verted rental income and violated court orders, and ordered the receiver
to sell the property.495 On September 9, 1992, Brosseau filed his second
recusal motion496 and then appealed the trial judge's failure to address it
(presumably along with his appeal of the August ruling). In 1995, the
Beaumont Court of Appeals held that the trial judge had erred in not
addressing the recusal motion, but on remand the trial court denied the
motion.4 97 Brosseau then appealed his lack of notice of the recusal hear-
ing. Finding in Brosseau's favor, the court of appeals voided the trial
judge's actions taken after the recusal hearing and ordered another hear-
ing, held in February, 2001, that resulted in another denial.498 Eventually
the court of appeals found that Brosseau's recusal arguments had no
merit and had produced nothing but years of delay.49 9
This leads to the case in Mexico, which in 1996 had held that the 80451
stock was owned by Brosseau children's trust and a Mexican company,
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 386.
493. Id. at 391 (citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Found., 402 U.S.
313, 329 (1971)).
494. Id. at 385-86.
495. Id.
496. In September, 1991, Brosseau filed a motion to recuse the trial judge, but because
it was not verified, the trial judge refused to refer it to the presiding judge. Id. at 386.
497. Id.
498. Id.
499. Id. at 386.
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Desarrollo Turistico Alexa, S.A. de C.V. (DTA was not a party here), and
that Ranzau was not and never had been the owner.500 This decision
rested on two points-that Texas courts have no power to adjudicate title
to real property in Mexico, and that the Liberty County finding in
Ranzau's favor had been voided by the Beaumont Court of Appeals. On
this holding, Brosseau had moved for summary judgment in the Liberty
County trial court, and now appealed its denial. 50 1
Before reaching the Mexican judgment's preclusive effect, the court
had to consider that judgment's contention that Texas courts lacked juris-
diction to adjudicate claims to real property in Mexico. The court of ap-
peals rejected the in rem characterization and found instead that this was
a claim to personal property-the one share of stock in 80451 Holdings,
Ltd., whose sole asset was Casa T. Texas law deems corporate ownership
litigable as personal property even where the corporation owns real prop-
erty.50 2 Thus, the Texas court's jurisdiction was over personal property,
not real estate in Acapulco.
The question remained of the Mexican judgment's effect in the still-
unresolved Liberty case. In opposing preclusion, Ranzau cited the
grounds for nonrecognition under the Uniform Foreign Country Money
Judgment Recognition Act. 50 3 Although, the Act did not apply here be-
cause there was no foreign country money judgment at issue, the Beau-
mont Court of Appeals found that under its obligation to apply comity to
foreign judgments, the UFCMJRA was instructive on the preclusive ef-
fect to be given foreign country judgments.504 Ranzau had raised three of
the Act's discretionary grounds for refusing recognition.505 First, the
Mexican judgment conflicted with a 1994 bankruptcy judgment authoriz-
ing the bankruptcy trustee to convey the Casa T stock to Ranzau.50 6 Sec-
ond, the foreign country proceeding was contrary to several agreements
between the parties.50 7 The court did not reach the third ground-lack of
reciprocity 5 08-but found sufficient grounds under the first two for deny-
ing preclusive effect to the Mexican judgment.. The court found an addi-
500. Id. at 387.
501. Id. at 387.
502. Id. (citing Evans v. Prufrock Rests., Inc., 757 S.W.2d 804, 805-06 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1988, writ denied)).
503. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.005-.008, discussed supra at note 452.
504. Brosseau, 81 S.W.3d at 388-89.
505. The court noted the UFCMJRA three mandatory and seven discretionary grounds
for refusing recognition for a foreign country judgment. Id. at 388 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005 (Vernon 1997), and Dart v. Balaam, 953 S.W.2d 478, 489
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, no pet.)). The ten grounds are briefly stated, supra note
452.
506. Id. at 388-89 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(b)(4) (Vernon
1997)).
507. Id. at 389-90 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(b)(5) (Vernon
1997)). In settling other aspects of Brosseau's various lawsuits involving the Casa T prop-
erty, Brosseau had conveyed or agreed to convey the property to Ranzau.




tional reason for denying preclusive effect in that the Mexican judgment
was based in part on the Beaumont court of appeals earlier voiding of the
judgment favoring Ranzau, which was later overturned. 50
9
509. In a prior trial, the Beaumont court of appeals had voided orders entered by a trial
judge that Brosseau sought to recuse. The Mexican court based its conclusion at least in
part on the voiding of those orders. The Beaumont court of appeals later found that the
trial judge had not erred in refusing to recuse himself, resulting in the reinstatement of the
earlier rulings contrary to Brosseau. Id. at 391.
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